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Transnational Corporations' Outward
Expression of Inward Self-Constitution:
The Enforcement of Human Rights
by Apple, Inc.
LARRY CATA BACKER*
ABSTRACT
Societal constitutionalism presents us with alternatives to
state-centered constitutional theory. But this alternative does not so
much displace as extend conventional constitutional theory as a set of
static premises that structure the organization of legitimate governance
units. Constitutional theory, in either its conventional or societal forms,
engages in both a descriptive and a normative project-the former
looking to the incarnation of an abstraction and the later to the
development of a set of presumptions and principles through which this
incarnation can be judged. Constitutional theory is conventionally
applied to states-that is, to those manifestations of organized power
constituted by a group of individuals, bounded by a territory, and
evidenced by the institution of government. But today a certain measure
of disaggregation has managed to manifest a constituting power.
Globalization has opened holes in the walls.that used to serve to police
and protect states and their power authority. Societal aggregations can
exist now between borders. Groups of individuals (and not just natural
persons) incarnate abstractions of governance and then judge them in
ways that are consonant with constitutional theory. These emerging
realities have produced societal constitutionalism. But like conventional
constitutionalism, societal constitutionalism seeks the comfort of
equilibrium and stasis as the basic operating premises of
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self-constituting governance systems. This paper considers societal
constitutionalism in its dynamic element-as a system structures
constant adjustment among the constituting elements of a governance
unit (whether state, corporation, religion, etc.)-in three dimensional
governance space. After an introduction, Section I engages in framework
setting, focusing on the structures of societal constitutionalism within the
logic of globalization. Section II provides an illustration of a societally
constituted enterprise operating in three dimensional dynamic
governance space. Section III then develops the more important
characteristics of this new dynamic and permeable constitutional
framework. The paper concludes where it started-suggesting the need to
expand our understanding of constitutional theory to include
communication among systems in a complex polycentric constituting
universe.
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional theory was once, and not so long ago,' the province of
the state.2 Its construction was meant to solidify and protect the
ideology of a world order grounded on the state as the supreme (or in
Marxist Leninist theory the sole)3  construction of abstract
social-political-economic societies. The state stood not merely as the sole
self-constituting community, but also, like the God of the Old
Testament, 4 produced an eco-system within a world populated by
distinct and well-ordered subordinate enterprises that defined the
1. See WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW 30
(1924).
2. See generally J.P. Nettl, The State as a Conceptual Variable, in 1 THE STATE:
CRITICAL CONCEPTS 9 (John A. Hall ed., Routledge 1994) (1968) (discussing how the
state's role in constitutional design and the social sciences has declined over the past fifty
years).
3. One must make a distinction between classical Marxist theory, which posited the
withering away of the state but in which the theory of the state remain ambiguous at best.
See Clyde Barrow, The Marx Problem in Marxian State Theory, 64(1) SCIENCE AND
SOCIETY 87-118 (2000) (with Leninism and post Leninist theory); THE HISTORICAL
EXPERIENCE OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT (1959), available at
http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/HEDP56.pdf. Cf. VLADIMIR LENIN, THE STATE AND
REVOLUTION, COLLECTED WORKS, VOLUME 25 381-492, available at http://www.marxists.
orglarchivellenin/works/1917/staterev/ (especially The 'Withering Away" of the State, and
Violent Revolution).
4. See Genesis 1:1.
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international order,5 but also the private ecologies of the modern
nongovernmental organization6 and the economic enterprise.7
But globalization, like the apple well digested by Adam and Eve, 8
has expelled both constitution and constituting elements from the state
of the Garden of Eden. 9 There has been scholarly movement away from
the state and even public international organization paradigms,o to
include private actors." The result has been the production of a mass of
self-constituting and constituted societies,12 which exist in vertically and
horizontally vectored arrangements of simultaneously governing,
functionally differentiated" governance organs.14 It has also produced a
movement to advance another singular political project-the
5. See Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2006)
(providing a description of these enterprises).
6. See generally Bob Reinalda & Bertjan Verbeek, Theorizing Power Relations
Between NGOs, Intergovernmental Organizations, and States, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 145 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001) (assessing the influence of
nongovernmental organizations on international and transnational politics, as well as the
importance of nonstate actors).
7. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Introduction to HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND RESISTANCE (Larry CatA Backer ed.,
2007).
8. See Genesis 3:6.
9. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred
Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (Christian
Joerges et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the effects of globalization on the governance of
international regulations like the Internet).
10. See, e.g., Layna Mosley, Private Governance for the Public Good?: Exploring Private
Sector Participation in Global Financial Regulation, in POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND
NONSTATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS 126 (Helen V. Milner & Andrew Moravesik eds.,
2009) (discussing globalization effects on international markets and the roles played by
private actors).
11. For an early and influential call to this effort, see generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE &
JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (3d ed., Longman 2001) (1977). See also
PETER R. BAEHR, NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (2009).
12. I avoid the term "communities" because of its close connection with the work of
another century and another sensibility. See, e.g., FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND
CIVIL SOCIETY (Jose Harris ed., Margaret Hollis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001)
(1887).
13. See, e.g., Anders Esmark, The Functional Differentiation of Governance: Public
Governance Beyond Hierarchy, Market and Networks, 87 PUB. ADMIN. 351 (2009)
(exploring the relation between the historical constitution of modern society's governance
traditions and the transformation of public governance).
14. See generally DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE 1-21 (2008).
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development of a single global government. 15 But it has also suggested
the basic condition of fragmentation and power decentering as the basic
condition within which governance is constituted.1 6 And it has also
produced movements that suggest that what appears to be a broadening
of constitutionalism outward from the state is instead the development
of a kinetic element to governance grounded in networks,17 or of
institutions that now mediate between legal, political, and economic
realms.'8 That religion is not included merely suggests an additional
topic for the future when its constituting power becomes harder to
avoid.' 9 But most importantly, it has begun to interrogate the current
limits of constitutional theory-moving analysis from a grounding in
state to one in societal constitutionalism. 20 But does this alternative
extend rather than displace conventional constitutional theory as a set
of static premises that structure the organization of legitimate
governance units?
Constitutional theory is grounded in two principal objectives-the
first is to incarnate an abstraction, and the second is to develop a set of
presumptions and principles through which this incarnation can be
15. See RICHARD FALK & ANDREW STRAUSS, A GLOBAL PARLIAMENT: ESSAYS AND
ARTICLES 13-18 (2011); Alexander Wendt, Why a World State is Inevitable, 9 EUR. J. INT'L
REL. 491, 491 (2003).
16. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999,
1017-1044 (2004).
17. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (arguing that a new
manner of global governance has emerged through the use of ad hoc or treaty-based
security and financial networks); Lars Viellechner, The Network of Networks: Karl-Heinz
Ladeur's Theory of Law and Globalization, 10 GERMAN L.J. 515, 517-18 (2009) (citing
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric
Networks: Can Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 89, 99, 113 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004)) ("[H]e rather
recognizes an adequate pattern of social organization for a radically fragmented and
globalized society in a 'network of networks' of heterarchical social relationships
generating collective order as a secondary transsubjective effect of individual cooperation
and coordination under conditions of uncertainty.").
18. See Moritz Renner, Occupy the System! Societal Constitutionalism and Transnational
Corporate Accounting, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 941 (2013).
19. See Larry CatA Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New
Legal Global Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 99, 106 (2009).
20. See Gunther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond
the Nation State, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 327, 328-29 (Petra Dobner &
Martin Loughlin eds., 2010) ("[Hlow is constitutional theory to respond to the challenges
arising from these two major trends of privatisation and globalisation? This is what
today's 'constitutional question' ought to be. Today's constitutionalism moves beyond the
nation state. It does so in a double sense: constitutionalism moves into the transnational
context and into the private sector.").
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judged. 21 With respect to the first objective, constitutional theory can be
understood as engaging in a descriptive project. This project, of course,
is one that also evidences choices among characteristics deemed
necessary to reify the idea of the constituent elements, the constituting
acts, and the outlines of the object constituted.22 Michel Foucault, 23
perhaps, understood this best, without understanding its application to
constitutional theory, when he described the way in which mass society
has itself been incarnated from out of the mass of statistics, measures,
habits, affinities, and characteristics that serve as an aggregation of
circumstantial evidence of the object identified, and thus identified,
given "life" (reality).24 That is, abstractions like society and government
are understood only by reference to the means by which their presence
and effects are measured. The choice of what to measure, then, also
becomes a choice about how to construct society, its premises, and
characteristics. Gunther Teubner 25 understood best the functional
characteristics of the formerly functionally constrained notion of law. 26
But the descriptive project of constitutional theory does not produce a
singular incarnation (despite the often misleading assertions of
advocates of one or another of the forms it has taken). As such,
constitutional theory must also be grounded judgment, and thus the
second objective.
With respect to this second objective, constitutional theory can be
understood as engaging in a normative project-a project that speaks to
fundamental values in the relationship of the entity to its members and
to others,27 and to constrain politics. 28 This is a project that is meant to
21. See Larry CatA Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global
Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671 (2009).
22. See Kaarlo Tuori, The Failure of the EU's Constitutional Project: A Cultural
Discrepancy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: NEW CHALLENGES: EUROPEAN LAW FROM A NORDIC
PERSPECTIVE 103, 109 (2008) ("In the political system, the constitution fulfills both an
organizational and a legitimizing function. The organizational part . . . defines the basic
institutional structure of political power . . . The constitution channels the legitimacy of
the law into the political system.").
23. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a highly influential, though controversial,
philosopher and social theorist well known for his work on the nature of governance and
institutional power and control. For biographies, see DIDIER ERIBON, MICHEL FOUCAULT
(Betsy Wing, trans., 1991); DAVID MACEY, THE LIVES OF MICHEL FOUCAULT (1994).
24. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE
COLLtGE DE FRANCE 1977-1978, at 110 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans.,
Macmillan 2007) (2004).
25. Professor Gunther Teubner is a German legal scholar and sociologist, best known
for his works within the field of Social Theory of Law.
26. See Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukowina" Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3-5 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
27. See Larry CatA Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious
Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 11 (2008).
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help distinguish among incarnations of institutional actors,29 as well as
among those societal aggregations from which such constructions might
arise. It thus is meant to tie constitution to the greater project of social
normative construction. Constitutional theory speaks of these
distinguishing values/premises in terms of democracy, human rights
and dignity, sustainability, and the like. But again, even the
construction of social normative structures occurs in the plural. So,
constitutional theory must also account for the normative values that
would be central to its normative project-developing a basis for judging
the choice and use of normative values in the incarnation of a
constituted social object. To this end, legitimacy becomes a central
component of the normative project of constitutional theory, with the
evaluation of the "guts" of the incarnated (constituted) being the great
focus. Constitutional theory speaks of these distinguishing
values/premises in terms of rule of law, process, accountability,
participation, and the like. That discussion is as possible within
nonstate governance units as it is within states. That is part of the
urtext of societal constitutionalism, at once primal, seminal, or
prototypical.
Constitutional theory, traditionally, has been applied to creations
holding political power-that is, to those manifestations of organized
power constituted by a group of individuals, bounded by a territory, and
evidenced by the institution of government. 30 Territory and power
served as the boundaries from within which these incarnations of
aggregated existence operated-whether in legitimate or illegitimate
form. Power was understood to be plenary (and thus political) in the
sense that it could extend to the management of the life, property, and
liberty of individuals subject to its will.31 Such creations (national
states) were autonomous and supreme within their territory. These
territories would have to deal with other territories differently from the
28. PEDRO CRUZ VILLALON, LA FORMACION DEL SISTEMA EUROPEO DE CONTROL DE
CONSTITUCIONALIDAD (1918-1939) (1987) (analyzing European constitutional experiences
between the First and Second World Wars).
29. For example, constitutionalism's normative project has as an objective the creation
of structures of taxonomies of governments by type and of ways to distinguish among
them. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and
Genetic Defects, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 39 (Michel Rosenfeld, ed., 1994).
30. See Dieter Grimm, The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: NEW CHALLENGES: EUROPEAN LAW FROM A NORDIC PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 22, at 71, 81 ("From a historical perspective, the constitution presupposes the state as a
form of political community.").
31. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (the state's power to deprive individuals of their life,
liberty, or property is limited only by concepts of due process).
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way they interacted with persons or entities within their territory.
These states developed methods of communication with each other that,
in its day, were understood by the monikers international law and
relations. For some, those monikers remain the unique boundary posts
of constitutional discourse, within which all else ought to be
subsumed.32 The extension of traditional constitutional theory is
sometimes structured within notions of cosmopolitanism-though ones
in which like systems are always matched with like systems. 33
In contrast, societal constitutionalism is grounded in the insight
that today a certain measure of disaggregation has managed to manifest
a constituting power, manifestations that are understood to exist within
a constitutional framework. 34 Globalization has opened holes in the
walls that used to police and protect states and their power authority.
Societal aggregations can exist now between borders. Groups of
individuals (and not just natural persons) incarnate abstractions of
governance and then judge them in ways that are consonant with
constitutional theory. The territorial demarcations of these "states" are
functional, and their power is bounded by the logic of the purpose of
their existence. Yet, even without territory or the full panoply of
political power, they can manifest an autonomous self-awareness and
functionality that recalls the constitutional structures of states.3 5
Though not states, they exist as constitutional entities all the same.
These entities are developing methods of communicating with each
other and with states through a variety of mechanisms-only some of
which are grounded in the forms and content of traditional structures of
law.36
The absence of territory also makes demarcation more nebulous.
These societal constitutional organisms exist without the orderly
arrangement of states (and the entities they have spawned within the
international sphere). More complicated still, these societally
constituted organisms exist alongside, within, between, and among
states. Polycetricity, thus, marks the new world order for constitutional
32. Id. at 80.
33. See Viad F. Perju, Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional Self-Government, 8 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 326 (2010).
34. See, e.g., DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALIsM: FOUNDATIONS
OF A NON-MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY (1992).
35. See, e.g., GUNTER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTs: SOCIETAL CONSTTUTIONALSiM
AND GLOBALIZATION (2012). Cf. Richard Albert, The Cult of Constitutionalism, 39 FLA. ST. L. REV.
373(2012).
36. See Larry CatA Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview, in BEYOND
TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 87
(Giinther Handl et al. eds., 2012).
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organisms. 37 This sometimes produces a tendency to develop
meta-management approaches.38 In a world infused with incarnated
constitutional beings existing polycentrically in a virtual
three-dimensional bowl filled with the stuff of constitutional possibility,
the bowl itself will not be visible and the constitutional possibilities
within it will resist management of any effective kind.3 9
Like conventional constitutionalism, societal constitutionalism
seeks the comfort of equilibrium and stasis as the basic operating
premises of self-constituting governance systems. This paper considers
societal constitutionalism in its dynamic element-as a system
structures constant adjustment among the constituting elements of a
governance unit (whether state, corporation, religion, etc.). Building on
Gunther Teubner's insights of communicative hypercycle and ultra
cycle, 40 it introduces the concept of dynamic societal constitutionalism.
The dynamic element of societal constitutionalism posits disequilibrium
as the equilibrium state for societally constituted systems. Equilibrium
is aberrational, though the coherence of the institutions within which
dynamic interaction happens is itself relatively stable. The
self-referencing communication at the core of dynamic institutional
coherence creates conditions for a constant state of dynamic flux as
stakeholders and the governance apparatus adjust behavior to
maximize welfare. Systemic integrity is grounded in the constitutional
norms within which a governance unit is organized, but even these are
connected to frameworks of common standards shared by governance
unit stakeholders. Dynamic societal constitutionalism suggests that just
37. Larry Catd Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable
Governance: The Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations' 'Protect,
Respect and Remedy" and the Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 25 PAC.
McGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69 (2012) (analyzing an example of the framework of the
U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights). See also Inger-Johanne Sand,
Polycontextuality as an Alternative to Constitutionalism, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND
CONSTITUIONALISM, supra note 9, at 41.
38. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural
Principles for Managing Global Legal Pluralism, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 665
(2013).
39. For a recent, quite thought-provoking effort at both seeing the bowl and suggesting
the possibility of management, see Christian Joerges, Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism:
Ambitions and Problems (ZENTRA Working Papers in Transnational Studies, No.
10/2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2182092 ("There
are many ways to avoid, to suspend or to manage conflict constellations. If we identify
responses which 'deserve recognition' because they are based upon considerations of
jusitce, we can adhere to the notion of law." Id. at 19).
40. See Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On The Linkage Of "Private"
And 'Public" Corporate Codes Of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617, 632-35
(2011).
812
THE ENFORCEMENT OF HuMAN RIGHTS BY APPLE, INC.
as the absence of territory as a basis for constituting a governance space
has made regulatory frameworks more fluid and permeable, it also
reduces the importance of stability as a necessary ingredient for
institutional coherence and societal stability.
After an introduction, Section I engages in framework setting, a
consideration that necessarily structures societies and their constitution
from a spatially static and inward-looking perspective. That
investigation is divided into two parts: first, the parameters for the
ordering system of states and nonstate actors, and second, a brief
consideration of the constitution of corporate actors within this
framework. The specific object of the second part is the multinational
corporation, an exemplar of a self-constituted enterprise at the center of
an autonomously constituted governance system, with its focus on
Apple, Inc.
Section II provides an illustration of a societally constituted
enterprise operating in three dimensional dynamic governance space; it
seeks to describe the dynamics of societal constitution within dynamic
polycentric structures of effect and communication. The focus is Apple,
Inc.; the context is the enforcement of international human rights
norms through the governance activities of Apple Inc. and its supply
chain, specifically the spaces where systems converge, harmonize, and
collide. The object is to consider a societally constituted governance unit
operating in three-dimensional space that is in constant motion, but
within which the entity remains stable. Like the state within a dynamic
international system, Apple Inc. assumes a central place around which,
and through its operations, produces collisions between its societal
constitution, its formal place within the constitution of states, and its
functional role within the constitution of global economic society within
this multidimensional governance space, and the permeability of its
operations and structural coupling while retaining a stable internal
governance framework. This suggests a dynamic element of societal
constitutionalism that tends to be overlooked in standard accounts that
posit a static governance universe, even if a layered one.
Section III then develops the more important characteristics of this
new dynamic and permeable constitutional framework. If societies can
be understood as subject to certain principles for their inward
constitution, to what extent might there be principles that affect the
outward expression of inward self-constitution? That consideration
requires both an examination of the way in which societally constituted
entities may be felt and seen by outsiders and also the way that
expressive communication can have inward-affecting consequences. For
813
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that purpose, Gunther Teubner's notions of addiction 4' and chaos42 and
Hans Lindahl's notions of spatiality and communication43 serve as a
starting point. Proceeding from the intuitions derived from Section II, it
deepens the insights of a dynamic element within societal
constitutionalism. Thought of merely as a static
structuring-conventional analysis may fail to capture the critical
importance of structural coupling in defining both the autonomy of
systems and their communicative intimacies among systems in a
complex polycentric constituting universe. Building on networks and
irritants in the governance space, this section uses a recent episode in
the operations of Apple, Inc. as an example of the behavior of systems
within a governance space characterized by fragmentation, fluidity,
polycentricity, and permeability. 44 The example may illustrate a
possible difference between public and private constitutional spaces.
Public law-based constitutionalism, positing stasis and equilibrium as
the normal state, 45 treats conditions of disequilibrium, a constant state
of change or revolution, as aberrational. 46 Equilibrium is a sign of
41. See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying
Law Ends Up in New Divergences, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF LAW: THE LEGAL EFFECTS
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 243 (Francis G. Snyder ed., 2000).
42. Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logistics of 'Hit the Bottom,' in
AFTER THE CATASTROPHE: ECONOMY, LAW AND POLITICS IN TIMES OF CRISIS (Poul F. Kjaer
& Gunther Teubner eds., 2010).
43. See Hans Lindahl, The Boundaries of Legal Orders in a Postnational Setting:
Conceptual, Normative and Institutional Issues, in THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE
FUTURE OF LAW 355 (Sam Muller et al. eds., 2011), available at http://www.fichl.org/file
admin/fichl/documents/FICHL_11_Web.pdf.
44. See Larry Cata Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st
Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 177
(2012).
45. "[I]ndeed, it has always seemed to me that a primary purpose of constitutionalism
is precisely to entrench certain principles and structures against change, particular
change driven by popular pressure." Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the
Underenforcement Problem: The Case of National Healthcare Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157, 185 (2012). See also Russell Muirhead & Nancy L. Rosenblum, The Partisan
Connection, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 99 (2012) ("The purpose of eighteenth-century
constitutionalism was twofold, and each purpose was in tension with the other; on one
hand, to facilitate popular power and empower 'the common, recognizable interests of
ordinary people, and nothing more.' On the other, to constrain popular power to ensure
that majorities could not overwhelm the 'permanent and aggregate interests of the
community,"' id. citing in part Philip Pettit, Democracy, Electoral and Contestatory, in 42
NOMOS: DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 134 (Ian Shapiro & Steven Macedo eds.,
2000)); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Project Gutenberg Etext ed. 1992),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fedpaper.txt.).
46. It is easiest to contrast the equilibrium and stability of constitutionalism with
notions of permanent revolution best described by Leon Trotsky. Leon Trotsky, The
Permanent Revolution (1931), available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1931/
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system integrity and success. 47 Dynamic societal constitutionalism
produces a more complex model of the well-known but utterly two
dimensional "living constitution"48 through which mass preferences are
in constant dialogue with common norms to produce stable governance
under conditions of constant change that may or may not be dependent
on the state or any specific judicial apparatus.49
The paper concludes where it started-in constitutional theory. It
suggests the need to expand our understanding of constitutional theory
beyond incarnation and judgment, to include communication among
systems in a complex polycentric constituting universe. It suggests the
dynamic consequences of this emerging societal framework of
hierarchical power arrangements and horizontal effects for
constitutional theory among this amalgam of states and other societally
constituted organisms.
tpr/pr-index.htm (ast visited Aug. 13, 2013) ("The permanent revolution, in the sense
which Marx attached to this concept, means a revolution which makes no compromise
with any single form of class rule, which does not stop at the democratic stage, which goes
over to socialist measures and to war against reaction from without: that is, a revolution
whose every successive stage is rooted in the preceding one and which can end only in the
complete liquidation of class society."). These might also have been in evidence during the
Chinese Cultural Revolution. See Mo Jihong, The Constitutional Law of the People's
Republic of China and Its Development, 23 COLuM. J. ASIAN L. 137 ("The 1975 and 1978
Constitutions were influenced by the extreme leftist sentiments of the Cultural
Revolution, which promoted a theory of continuing revolution under proletarian
dictatorship, inconsistent with the basic principles of modern constitutionalism." Id. at
139). Both have been rejected by notions of stability inherent in Western and Chinese
constitutionalism, through policies of "general welfare" and "harmonious society."
47. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693, 704-06 (1976) (on the judicial role in promoting constitutional stability).
48. Two-dimensional in the sense that communication is abstracted through the
institutions of the state separated by function and each constructed to represent an aggregate
understanding of popular sentiment. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, Constitutional
Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 1355 (2005) ("Advocates of the concept of a 'living constitution,' for example,
reason in terms of a body of constantly remade constitutional doctrine-surely an unhelpful
approach given the continuity and stability characteristic of most areas of constitutional law."
Id. at 1363); see also Paul Brest, The Intentions of the Adopters Are in the Eyes of the Beholder,
in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 17-18 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr. ed., 1990) (focusing on stability and flexibility).
49. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered
Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 26-27
(Christian Joerges, Inge-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004). For a good discussion
of the germinal literature from which these ideas arise, see David Nelken, Eugen Ehrlich,
Living Law, and Plural Legalities, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 443 (2008).
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I. CONSTITUTING A SOLAR SYSTEM OF ACTORS
No discussion of the ordering systems of self-constituting societies is
possible without a sense of the normative framework within which this
self-constituting and the communication between these self-constituting
organs exist.50 This section briefly suggests the contours within which
societies constitute themselves and the way in which their legitimacy is
judged. It then describes the normative framework within which human
rights are recognized and governed. Finally, it identifies the various
constitutional societies that together map the polycentric system within
which human rights specific governance exists.
A. An Ordering System of States and Nonstate Actors: The Starting
Point for State and Societal Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism itself, whether in the form of the narrow
state-based constitutionalism or the broader concepts of societal
constitutionalism, remains a contested idea, even when connected
entirely to the state and the political,5 ' and especially when it is applied
autonomously to nonstate actors.52 The state, itself, as the framework
into which constitutionalism is projected, has been unmasked as
contingent and fragile, sometimes irrelevant. 53 Constitutionalism's
50. 'The thesis is: the emergence of a multiplicity of civil constitutions. The constitution of
world society does not come about exclusively in the representative institutions of international
politics, nor can it take place in a unitary global constitution which overlies all areas of society,
but, instead, emerges incrementally in the constitutionalisation of a multiplicity of autonomous
sub-systems of world society." Teubner, supra note 9, at 8.
51. Constitutionalism in this context is discussed in Backer, supra note 21. Its arrested
development within state ideology constructs is discussed in Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan
Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 605 (2013). See also Reza Dibadj, Panglossian Transnationalism, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 253
(2008).
52. Ulrich K Preuss, Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global
Constitutionalism a Viable Concept, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITIONALISM, supra note 20,
at 23, 43.
53. See generally Peter T. Leeson & Claudia R. Williamson, Anarchy and Development:
An Application of the Theory of Second Best, 2 LAW & DEV. REV. 75 (2009) ("[Clonditional
on failure to satisfy a key institutional condition required for ideal political
governance-constrained politics-citizens' welfare is maximized by departing from the
other conditions required for this form of governance: state-supplied law and courts,
state-supplied police, and state-supplied public goods."); Ken Menkhaus, Governance
Without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, 31
INT'L SECURITY 74 (2007) (explaining that Somalia has been without a functional central
government since 1991); Larry CatA Backer, Of Somali Pirates, Global Corporations and
the State: Governance Without Government, Government Without a State and Military
Power, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (June 28, 2009, 5:04 PM),
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connection to law has also spawned substantial debate. 54 The debate
intensifies when the logic and ideology of state-centered law is used to
attempt to domesticate nonlaw governance systems. 5 5 More importantly,
its application to nonstate actors generates a substantial amount of
controversy as well.5 6 Even when there is a concession to the idea that
constitutionalism itself is not inherently bundled with the construction
of political states, there is a concern that its own self constitution may
be impeded in part by the state from which it arose or the market
within the orbit of which it may disintegrate.57 Moreover, the basic issue
of constitutionalism-defining the borders of self-constructed
constitutionalist orders-remains acute.58 Deterritorialization may also
both strengthen5 9 and weaken6 0 national political constitutionalism.
http://1cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/06/of-somali-pirates-global-corporations.html
(viewing the recent ransoming of a ship by Somali pirates as an example of the overlap of
private and public regimes, nonstate governments, traditional states, and nonstate
entities as regulators).
54. See, e.g., Jaye Ellis, Constitutionalization of Non-Governmental Certification Programs,
20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1035 (2013); Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM.
J. COMP. L. 499 (2006); Craig Scott, Transnational Law' as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions,
10 GERmAN L.J. 877 (2009).
55. E.g., Ming-Sung Kuo, Taming Governance with Legality? Critical Reflections Upon
Global Administrative Law as Small-C Global Constitutionalism, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 55 (2011).
56. See, e.g., Christopher Thornhill, A Sociology of Constituent Power: The Political
Code of Transnational Societal Constitutions, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 551 (2013)
("Transnational societal constitutions, it is claimed, in fact remain instruments, albeit at a
high level of dispersal, for the societal allocation and distribution of power. Furthermore,
the paper argues that transnational societal constitutions reproduce themselves through
an intensification of the inclusionary and power-producing functions of rights already
established in national-state constitutions.").
57. See Emilios Christodoulidis, On the Politics of Societal Constitutionalism, 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 629 (2013) (describing how distance from the state may undercut its
grounding and the power of the market may capture it, producing mutual thwarting
rather than engagement).
58. See Saskia Sassen, Visible Formalizations and Formally Invisible Facticities, 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 3 (2013). Indeed, yet in Africa, internationalization and
de-territorialization might appear to aid the process of strengthening the state. See also
Charles Manga Fombad, Internationalization of Constitutional Law and Constitutionalism in
Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 439, 463-71 (2012).
59. See, e.g., Hans Lindahl, We and Cyberlaw: The Spatial Unity of Constitutional Orders,
20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 697 (2013) ("[T]o claim that spatial boundaries are no longer a
constituent feature of post-state legal orders is effectively to hold that the boundaries of the
territorial state, or of earlier spatially bounded communities, exhaust the manner in which
legal orders close themselves into an inside vis-A-vis an outside").
60. See, e.g., Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and
Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579,
580 (2006) (explaining how regionalization, global networks, and de-territorialization are
contributing to de-constitutionalization on the domestic level).
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Indeed, the connection between constitutions and the state may serve to
reduce the relevance constitutionalism itself as the normative or
structuring vehicle for the organization of governance units
institutionalized into something that resembles but is not government. 61
Constitutionalism, whether or not detached from the state, 62 frames
a discussion about the organization of power. When individuals
aggregate something-power, capital, goods, labor, or anything else of
mutual benefit-those individuals, and others who deal with this
aggregation, face a fundamental difficulty in two parts. The first part
involves reification; a constituted society must understand itself to exist
and others must understand the nature of this existence in the same
way.63 For example, the corporation is manifested through its financial
statements (rather than, for example, through reports about its impacts
on the social, economic, or environmental impacts of its activities on
others), which produces a very specific way of manifesting corporations
that is in line with normative assumptions about its "nature."64
Likewise, the state is manifested to foreigners by its borders and to its
inhabitants by its police powers, each shaped by the assumptions about
the "nature" of the state. This implicates two issues: one involving the
construction of an autonomous consciousness of this aggregation (its
government), and the other involving the acts and forms required to
make the aggregation "seen and felt" by others (people who are
strangers to the constitution of an aggregation).65 Internal and external
recognition are the first markers of the constituting entity. Form and
function in the construction of the felt realities of these aggregations
61. See Riccardo Prandini, The Future of Societal Constitutionalism in the Age of
Acceleration, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 731 (2013) (challenging the state constitutionalist
concepts that constitutions are legitimized through consent of the state's subjects, that
constitutions are structures for managing and constraining power, and that constitutions
institutionalize a permanent relationship between governance apparatus and its subjects).
62. Cf. Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002).
63. See, e.g., Roman Guski, Autonomy as Sovereignty: On Teubner's Constitutionalization of
Transnational Function Regimes, 11(2) INT. J. CONST. L. 523-36 (2013). See generally GUNTHER
TEUBNER, LAW As AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Zenon Bankowski ed., Anne Bankowska & Ruth
Adler trans., 1993); Gunther Teubner, Hypercycle in Law and Organization: The Relationship
Between Self-Observation, Self-Constitution and Autopoiesis, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 43 (Alberto Febrajjo ed., 1988).
64. These assumptions serve as the foundation for corporate disclosure under the U.S.
federal securities laws, see, for example, Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. Part 210, and are also the
foundation of investor views of the corporation-that is, the sum of its financial
characteristics.
65. There is a parallel here to the notion of recognition of states in international law.
See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 (listing requirements for recognizing personhood with its basis in acquiring all
the characteristics that the community of like constituted organizations recognize as
essential for self constitution).
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remain a lively topic of debate between "institutionalists" concerned
with the organization of the apparatus of self-constitution,66 those
worried about inclusion in the process of self-constitution,67 and the
"anarchists" concerned with the dismantling of power-hierarchy systems
in favor of polycentric and horizontally-aligned inter-connected
systems. 68
The second part of aggregation by individuals involves normative
values that implicate system legitimacy. Legitimacy, like reification, can
also be understood in two aspects. The first aspect involves the adoption
of processes that remove the operation of governance organs from the
control of individuals. That is, the organization is operated to maximize
the welfare of the organization (or of its members understood as all
members) in a manner that avoids arbitrary decision-making or
operation for the benefit of some individuals rather than for the
community as a whole. This is sometimes understood under notions of
Rechtsstaat, or process rule of law.6 9 It is criticized as a move toward
authoritarian managerialism. 7 0 The second aspect involves the values
that are meant to be advanced under legitimate process systems. These
Sozialstaat notions have become central to the ideals of legitimacy in
the construction of aggregations that have become self-constituting
actors.7' For political organs, like states, those notions are the product
of the shared values of the national community, but they may also be
tempered by limiting norms and values of the international community,
memorialized in the pronouncements of international organizations and,
more narrowly, by international law.72 This latter project can be
66. Institutionalists cross the political spectrum from Stalinists to free market
advocates. See Larry Cati Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant and the Crisis of the
State: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141 (2006).
67. See, e.g., Gavin W. Anderson, Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and
Constitutionalism from Below, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 881 (2013).
68. For a modern articulation of this debate in the constitutionalist setting, see Saki
Bailey & Ugo Mattei, Social Movements as Constituent Power: The Italian Struggle for the
Commons, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 965 (2013). See generally the essays in THE
ANARCHIST COLLECTIVES: WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE SPANISH REVOLUTION
1936-1939 (Sam Dolgoff ed., 1990).
69. Rule of law is a vast topic beyond the scope of this essay. For a discussion of the
rule of law in globalization, for example, see SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 14, at 205-22;
ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).
70. See Joerges, supra note 39.
71. On substantive rule of law, see, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH
TOWARD RULE OF LAW 2-55 (2002) (exploring substantive constitutionalism through the
prism of rule of law concepts).
72. See Backer, supra note 27, at 17; Cheryl Saunders, Towards a Global Constitutional
Gene Pool, 4 NA'L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2009).
819
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
problematic and has been criticized as a Western project of normative
neo-colonialism.73 For nonstate actors, the values framework may be
related specifically to the objectives that brought the community
together.74
Organization and legitimacy, then, mark the constitutional project.
And it is a project bounded by text-however broadly constructed.75 It is
hardly enough to merely treat constitutionalism as an internal act; it
has an external aspect as well. Constitutionalism requires the formation
of an autonomous organization by the members of the enterprise (state,
corporation, religious body) that is recognized as such by other
communities that will have to deal with this entity.76
Constitutionalism as weltanschauung contains within it
its own ontology (a descriptive model of legitimate
constitutions), explanations (the purpose of
constitutions), objectives (the ultimate aim of
constitutions), values (constitutional ethics),
methodology (a theory of action or means of obtaining
the goals of constitutions), epistemology (a theory of
knowledge, of figuring out true and false constitutions),
and its own etiology (an account of the building blocks of
constitutions). 77
Critical to this complex set of organizing presumptions for societal
constitutions is the fundamental premise of consent. Societally
constituted organizations are grounded in the consensual act of a group
that comes together for the purposes all members agree upon and that
then institutionalizes that aggregation so that the society created
becomes something that is autonomous of its members and is recognized
73. Yadh Ben Achour, L'Internationalisation du Droit Constitutionnel [Internationalization
of Constitutional Law], in 16 L'INTERNATIONALISATION DU DROlT CoNSTITUTIoNNEL: RECUEL
DES COURS [INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: COLLECTION OF COURSE] 22
(2007) (recognizing the neo-colonialist character but arguing that it appears in more palatable
form); Backer, supra note 27, at 16-17.
74. See Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INTL & COMp. L. 499 (2008).
75. Cf. Ino Augsberg, Reading Law: On Law as a Textual Phenomenon, 22 L. &
LITERATURE 369 (2010) (describing systems themselves as a form of textuality).
76. See generally Backer, supra note 21. Notions of incarnation as a basis for corporate
autonomy have been suggested. See Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87
TUL. L. REV. 457 (2013). These ideas parallel those long advanced in public law. See, e.g.,
ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY (1957) (on nonstate collective personality, see id. at 273-313).
77. Backer, supra note 21, at 720.
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as such by those with whom it must deal.78 Beyond this simple
constituting condition lies much of the methodological and substantive
detail of foundational organization understood as constituting an
autonomous body.79
I have earlier suggested a topology for this fundamental
understanding of the constitutionalist project for states.80 I have also
suggested its utility in the analysis of self-constituting nongovernmental
groups-principally nonstate corporate actors.8 ' Once one assumes
away the fundamental ordering principals of states-that they exist as
unique organizations of power fused from the union of people and
territory from which all other organizations are derived, or if not
derived, that can govern only through deployment of measures that are
less legitimate or authoritative (less than law)-the possibilities of
ordering the constitutions of organizations without a state become
clearer. The organizational element of a nonstate constitution centers
on four principal characteristics: (1) scope of authority, (2) institutional
autonomy, (3) regulatory authority, and (4) effectiveness of power to
settle disputes. 82 These have a constitutional element-the organizing
principles that give the regulatory community form and set its
organizational boundaries.83 These boundaries include the constitution
of a government apparatus and the rules for the operation of the
governance power vested in this organization. They also have
substantive and process elements, including the rules, laws, and other
78. This is what I have previously argued as the essence of the substantive or
constitutional component of transnational law. See Larry Catd Backer, Principles of
Transnational Law: The Foundations of an Emerging Field, Law at the End of the Day,
Mar. 9, 2007, available at http://cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/03/principles-of-transnati
onal-law.html. But others see in this a methodological component that then creates a
space for regulatory institutionalization within networks of governance systems. See
GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A
THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law,
Evolving (Dec. 15, 2011), Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 27/2011 (revising a prior
version produced for the Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Jan Smits, ed., 2006)).
79. See Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving (Osgoode Hall Law Sch.
Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 27/2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975403.
80. Backer, supra note 21, at 720.
81. See generally Larry Catd Backer, Transnational Corporate Constitutionalism: The
Emergence of a Constitutional Order for Economic Enterprises, Soc. Scl. RES. NETWORK
(April 10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractLid=2038081
(exploring the emerging principles of transnational constitutionalism as a basis for the
organization and integration of economic enterprises).
82. See Larry CatA Backer, Principles of Transnational Law: The Foundations of an
Emerging Field, Law at the End of the Day (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://1cbackerblog.
blogspot.com/2007/03/principles-of-transnational-law.html.
83. Id.
821
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
norms that are produced or administered by the community and the
process rules through which they are applied, enforced, constructed, and
interpreted. 84
The normative elements are grounded in legitimacy, and touch on
those structures that make it possible both to "see" the self-constituting
enterprise and to treat it, both inside and outside, as a "thing"
legitimately apart from its stakeholders.8 5 These societally constituted
enterprises, then, are structured as a system of taxonomy and
legitimation that is grounded in a set of normative assumptions about
the purpose of government and its connection to governance. One can
unpack this system in the form of five core elements: Constitutionalism
can be understood (1) as a system of classification; (2) the core object of
which is to define the characteristics of constitutions (those documents
that organize governance power within an institutional apparatus); (3)
to be used to determine the legitimacy of the constitutional system as
conceived or as implemented; (4) based on rule of law as the
fundamental postulate of government (that government be established
and operated in a way that limits the ability of individuals to use
government power for personal welfare maximizing ends); and (5)
grounded on a metric of substantive values derived from a source
beyond the control of any individual.8 6
This framework is applicable to all self-constituting governance
systems in which the organization of governance is overseen by an
institutional apparatus of some kind. But the resulting fracture and
decentering of the state has been criticized as well.87
Constitutionalism of this sort provides a point of
convergence between public and private governance
systems. It offers both norm and technique in the
constitution of governance that is not limited by the
conceptual blinders of a state system that, through its
imposition of hierarchy of legitimacy, reserves only to
the state the power of self constitution and regulatory
84. See GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSus AND RUNNING
CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010) (exploring the shifting
institutional and normative landscape of legal norm-creation).
85. See Backer, supra note 82.
86. Backer, supra note 21, at 679.
87. See generally Petra Dobner, On The Constitutionability of Global Public Policy
Networks, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 613-17 (2009).
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autonomy enforced through territorially based
enforcement units.88
B. An Amalgamation of Governments: The Multinational Corporation
Societal constitutionalism, then, represents an articulation of a
general framework of governance power that is not dependent-that is
not grounded in the first instance-on the state as the model from
which governance and its institutionalization is understood and shaped.
The constitutional natures of nonstate organizations are revealed
beyond the veiling presumptions of the state system.89 Like states, these
organizations comprise internally coherent, closed, self-reflexive
systems grounded in a set of norms that provide the basis of systemic
constitution and the filter through which communication with outside
systems may be effectuated.9 0
Among the most interesting of these nonstate organizations is the
multinational corporation: a society that is both self-constituted and
embedded at the center of a web of governance rules from which these
enterprises draw to develop their own autonomous and autonomously
applied governance systems.9 ' Self-constitution is possible precisely
because the multinational corporation thrives in governance spaces
between states, beyond international law, and among both,92 operating
conditions made possible under globalization. 93
88. Backer, supra note 66, at 117 ("It also suggests that beyond organizing norms and
legitimating processes that avoid arbitrary and personal capture of power, constituting
power can be organized simultaneously under any number of normative (value)
frameworks.").
89. By veiling presumptions, I mean the set of basic premises that tend to obscure the
privilege built into the system in favor of states. These presumptions build a sense that the
subordination of enterprises and other organizations ot states is "natural" and that "law"
produced by states is "naturally" the touchstone for legitimate expression of a popular will. See
Larry CatA Backer, On the Tension between Public and Private Governance in the Emerging
Transnational Legal Order: State Ideology and Corporation in Polycentric Asymmetric Global
Orders (Apr. 16, 2012), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract-2038103 or
http://dx.doi.org/lO.2139/ssrn.2038103. For an analysis of a similar autonomous organism, Gap,
Inc., see generally Backer, supra note 74.
90. This touches on what Gunther Teubner describes as systemic hypercycles and
ultracycles. See Teubner, supra note 40, at 634 ("A hypercycle emerges when
communicative operations within a closed network form cycles that are interlinked in a
circular way. In contrast, an ultracycle emerges when a cycle of mutual perturbations is
developed between closed networks.").
91. See, e.g., id. at 621-28.
92. See Larry CatA Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of
Organizational Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REV.
541 (2006) (arguing that the nexus of multinational enterprises and globalization provides
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Self-regulation follows from the application of the
territorial principle, coupled with the possibilities of
enterprise autonomy reinforced by asset partitioning
regimes, self-ownership, and juridical personhood. An
autonomous legal subject, responsible for its own
obligations and able to direct itself can, by distributing
its operations in accordance with the benefits of
particular territorially limited legal regimes, effectively
choose the mix of regulation to which it will submit
itself. It follows that such an enterprise can regulate
itself. A fully self-conscious autonomy is now complete. 94
The embedding of multinational corporations within multiple and
polycentric governance structures can be identified from out of the
principal regulatory frameworks within which they operate. The first
framework form includes internal systems of supply chain governance
created by large multinational enterprises.95 The second framework
form is the emerging system of soft law governance principles96
developed under the auspices of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and, principally, the OECD's
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.97 The third form is the
principles-based U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human
Rights, which details a human rights due diligence framework for the
regulation of the human rights obligations of multinational
a foundation for the emergence of self-conscious, autonomous, self-regulating economic
enterprises).
93. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law Through the Lens
of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV. 1151 (2008); Kevin T. Jackson, The Normative Logic Of
Global Economic Governance: In Pursuit Of Non-Instrumental Justification For The Rule
Of Law And Human Rights, 22 MINN. J. INT'L L. 71. (2013).
94. Id. at 561.
95. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient
Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1739 (2007); Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J.
Soc. 297 (2007).
96. See, e.g., Martin Marcussen, OECD Governance Through Soft Law, in SoFn LAW IN
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 103 (Ulrika Morth ed., 2004); David Weissbrodt, Keynote
Address: International Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of
Businesses, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 373 (2008).
97. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: 2011 Edition (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/internationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
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corporations,98 elaborated by John Ruggie, the United Nation's
Secretary General Special Representative.99
Self-referential governance communities are narrowly constructed,
and functionally differentiated communities. 00  Functional
differentiation suggests a limited framework of governance. Nonstate
governance systems have a limited range. Functional differentiation
also suggests a simultaneous overlapping of governance. At the same
time, these are new and fragile systems. They are not fully developed.
They may change. They have their systems sociology.10 ' But they also
produce a space within their demarcated functionality that is
constitutionally sufficient for governance. This space is constituted
institutionally through a governance apparatus grounded in rule of law
principles,102 in the sense of both process rule of law (systems created
that legitimate the operations of the apparatus on the basis of rules for
producing rules and enforcing them) and substance rule of law (rules
are created in accordance with a process in which the members
participate and reflect shared values that reflect community
preferences). 103
So constituted, the multinational corporation operates substantially
like the state, though a state without a territory.104 It responds to the
desires of its citizens, investors, and consumers through the production
of policy and behaviors designed to enhance shareholder value and
consumer demand. Shareholder desires are also affected by a normative
framework exogenous to the multinational--one memorialized in
binding and nonbinding instruments of international and national law,
as well as other normative standards, sometimes bound up in concepts
98. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
& Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework,
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie),
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/medialdocuments/ruggie/ruggie-guiding
-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf.
99. See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819 (2007).
100. See Backer, supra note 74.
101. See generally NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS, (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk
Baecker trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1995) (1984) (reproducing the new systems theory of
self-reference within sociology).
102. See Terry Collingsworth, Beyond Public Relations: Bringing the Rule of Law to
Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy, 6 CORP. GOVERNANCE 250 (2006).
103. Consider in this light the apparatus of a company like Gap, Inc., described in
Backer, supra note 74, at 509-23.
104. Jean-Philippe Rob6, Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a Pluralistic
Legal Order, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 26, at 45, 45-47, 52-56.
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of corporate social responsibility and human rights. 105 These policies are
affected within the entity and its supply chain through contracts of a
regulatory character. Compliance is enforced directly by the entity and
also monitored by outsiders, principally civil society elements, and to
some more remote extent, the state and other public actors.10 6 The
threat of state intervention is also a disciplinary force.10 7 Civil society
actors gain legitimacy in their enforcement function through
relationships with the media-an organ that is at once both a producer
of similar norms within its own enterprise and a producer of
"sanctioned" information.1 08 But civil society also competes with the
corporate regulator in the construction of investor and consumer tastes
105. See, e.g., Florian Wettstein, Beyond Voluntariness, Beyond CSR: Making a Case for
Human Rights and Justice 114 BUS. & Soc'y REV. 125 (2009). "For several decades now
the term 'corporate social responsibility' has been used in this context to describe a
mechanism by which companies take responsibility for their actions and encourage a
positive impact through its activities on, inter alia, human rights." COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
STEERING COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Corporate
Social Responsibility in the Field of Human Rights, Presentation, available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/other-committees/hr and-business/defa
ultEN.asp. For the Report, see STEERING COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (CDDH),
Feasibility Study On Corporate Social Responsibility In The Field Of Human Rights, 76
the meeting Strasbourg 27-30 Nov. 2012, Addendum VII CDDH(2012) R76, available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/other-committees/hr-and-business/Doc
uments/CDDH%282012%29R76_AddendumVIIEN.pdf.
106. See discussion, Section II, infra. There are emerging NGOs the primary purpose of
which is to monitor compliance with internally developed or third party standards. This is
the case, for example, of COVERCO, the Commisison for the Verification of Codes of
Conduct, operating in Guatemala. What is COVERCO?, COVERCO, available at
http://www.coverco.org.gt/e_index.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). The Fair Labor
Association website nicely explains the three-part nature of private enforcement in a
supply chain context: (1) standard setting; (2) monitoring; and (3) technical assistance. See
Our Work, Protecting Workers' Rights Worldwide, FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work. On the trend, generally, toward private enforcement,
see, for example, Anne van Aaken, Trust, Verify, Or Incentivize? Effectuating Public
International Law Regulating Public Goods Through Market Mechanisms, 104 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 153 (2010); Errol E. Meidinger, "Private" Environmental Regulation,
Human Rights, And Community 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 123 (2000).
107. And states operate at the periphery of supply chain governance. See, e.g., Peder
Michael Pruzan-Jorgensen, Regulating Supply Chain Sustainability: What Would Have
Been Unthinkable Only a Few Years Ago is Now the Order of the Day, GUARDIAN
SUSTAINABLE Bus. (Sept. 12, 2011, 11:51 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-
business/blog/regulating-supply-chain-sustainability (describing some tentative and
precisely narrow extensions of home state law to the supply chain relations of
multinationals under the 2011 U.K. Bribery Act (bribery); the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 (conflict minerals); the California Transparency in Supply Chain Act (slavery and
human trafficking); and the EU Flegt Law (illegally logged timber)).
108. Consider in this light the apparatus of a company like Gap, Inc., described in
Backer, supra note 74, at 509-23.
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and sometimes participates with the corporate entity in the construction
of its regulatory standards for its supply chain.109 Taken together, what
is produced is a complete governance framework operating beyond the
territory of the state but also within a very narrow governance space.
At the same time, the community of multinational corporations, as a
functionally differentiated community, may construct a self-referencing
and autonomous regime of governance, though very narrowly focused,
which is free of substantial state interference, except as a foreign body
with which relations must be maintained.1 10 It is in this sense that the
old foundational notions of territoriality, as the marker par excellence of
jurisdiction, lose coherence.' The territory of norm creation and
enforcement within and among corporations can be conceived as
bounded by the territory of the operations of that community. The
extra-territorial is that which lies beyond the normative framework of
corporate governance, but the prime referent is no longer geography. It
is in that sense that one understands the receding of the state from
governance.
The OECD system of principles for the management of corporate
behavior beyond the domestic law of states creates a three-dimensional
governance "space" through networks of soft law systems developed by
complex partnerships between states, international organizations that
serve them and global actors, and the global actors that form the core of
the regulatory community.112 The clearest example is drawn from the
recent work of the OECD's National Contact Point system for the
enforcement of global soft law frameworks that radiate out from the
109. See, e.g., Erika N. Sasser et al., Direct Targeting as an NGO Political Strategy:
Examining Private Authority Regimes in the Forest Sector, Bus. & POL., Dec. 2006, at 1,
available at http:// www.bepress.com/bap/vol8/iss3/artl. See also Tim Bartley,
Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private
Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOCIOL. 297, 300, 319
(2007) (regarding campaigns against Nike).
110. See A. Claire Cutler, Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23 (Rodney Bruce Hall
& Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
111. See Gefion Schuler, Effective Governance Through Decentralized Soft Implementation:
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1753 (2008) (proposing
that effective governance is accomplished through multilevel partnership and decentralized
soft-mediation based implementation).
112. And thus seeks to rebut the early conceptual critique: "[S]oft law expresses a
preference and not an obligation that states should act, or should refrain from acting, in a
specified manner. The underlying assumption is that behavior, or forbearance from
behavior, in accordance with this preference will be directly beneficial to states." JOSEPH
GOLD, INTERPRETATION: THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 301 (1996). This governance
space is sometimes understood as "spaceless" in the sense that it moves governance
beyond territory, and thus beyond the premises that constrain lawmaking in the state
system. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 81; Backer, supra note 89.
827
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
OECD's Guidelines for Multinational Corporations. 113 These principles
tie autonomous multinational regulatory systems to the law systems of
states in which they operate, but at the same time, institutionalize a
stateless space within which corporations may be subject to substantive
norm frameworks developed by public bodies.114 These frameworks draw
their standards from multiple sources for the construction of an
autonomous framework of governance that is made applicable to actors
as a supplement to their obligations under the law-systems of states
asserting territorial jurisdiction,115 much like Ralf Michaels suggests for
lex mercatoria.116
The U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights follow
the pattern of OECD principles and rules but focus on the activities of
business with human rights impacts. They do, however, recognize the
polycentricity of business conduct with respect to human rights impact
and specifically acknowledge a space within which corporations may act
autonomously but in compliance with normative frameworks developed
in the "constitutional principles" embraced by corporations, as endorsed
by their investors and consumers, and as expressed in international law
and norms." 7 More importantly, the Guiding Principles also establish a
113. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 97, at 67-78.
114. See, e.g., U.K. Nat'l Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enters., Initial Assessment by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Survival International and Vedanta Resources plc, BUSINESS &
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Links/Repository/969215; U.K. Nat'l Contact Point for the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enters., Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point
for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Complaint from Survival
International Against Vedanta Resources plc, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE
CENTRE (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Links/Repository/266990;
U.K. Nat'l Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enters., Statement by
the United Kingdom National Contact Point (NCP) for OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (NCP): Das Air, Gov.UK (July 21, 2008), http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file473
46.doc; U.K. Nat'l Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enters., Final
Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) Ltd, Gov.UK, (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file
47555.doc.
115. See Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private
Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2004).
116. See generally Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria- Law Beyond the State, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2007) (arguing that the lex mercatoria heralds the shift
in global law from segmentary differentiation in different national laws to a functional
differentiation, as a law beyond the state).
117. Professor Ruggie noted early in the process of Guidelines formulation:
The "protect, respect and remedy" framework lays the foundations for
generating the necessary means to advance the business and human
rights agenda. It spells out differentiated yet complementary roles and
responsibilities for states and companies, and it includes the element
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mechanism for communication between autonomous governance
systems-one internal to the constituted corporation and the other
external and affecting corporate operations within defined, but
spatially-limited territories. 118 Mr. Ruggie suggests that multinational
corporations can occupy multiple regulatory spaces that only together
define a complete governance universe--one in which both law systems
and norm systems"z9 exist in a complex set of entwined horizontal
relationships. That leaves Mr. Ruggie in essentially new territory that
rejects the monopoly of law systems within states and the conception of
norm systems as nonbinding. As incompatible systems, law and norms
must effectively find a way to communicate and to harmonize values
and relevance for their constituting communities, whether these are
citizens, consumers, employees, or investors.
The importance of polycentric governance is also emphasized by this
system.120 Yet, polycentric governance tends to obscure the reality of
emerging autonomous governance, mistaking communication among
systems with limited jurisdictions for competitions for supremacy within
a single vertically-oriented arrangement of power.121 Still, at least
within the context of the multinational corporation, it is possible to
speak of governance without government,122 where the latter term is
of remedy for when things go wrong. It is systemic in character,
meaning that the component parts are intended to support and
reinforce one another, creating a dynamic process of cumulative
progress-one that does not foreclose additional longer-term
meaningful measures.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Opening Remarks on the
Consultation on Operationalizing the Framework for Business and Human Rights,
BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.business-
humanrights.orgLinks/Repository/105128.
118. See Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company
Constitutions Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS
AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION 203 (Rainer Nickel ed., 2010) (exploring intermeshing).
119. Cf. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Robert C. Ellickson,
Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 540 (1998).
120. See generally Backer, supra note 36.
121. See Jorg Friedrichs, The Meaning of New Medievalism, 7 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 475,
475 (2001) ("[M]edievalism is defined as a system of overlapping authority and multiple
loyalty, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims. . . . [T]he
post-international world is characterized by a complicated web of societal identities, held
together by the antagonistic organizational claims of the nation-state system and the
transnational market economy.").
122. For the classic formulation, see GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND
CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992);
Backer, supra note 95.
829
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
meant to refer to the state. It is also possible to speak, to some extent, of
government without a state as an element in the governance of
multinational regulation. What emerge within the corporation are
"self-sufficient, self-perpetuating and internally autonomous system[s]
of social relations" contained within the framework of its functionally
differentiated objectives. 123 It is possible to see the construction of
autonomous and self-referential social-norm systems outside of the
shadow of the territorially-bound law-systems of states, but these
systems also exist within a space richly populated by other systems of
social relations, the regulatory force of some of which affect the internal
and external relations of the self-constituted corporate society.
II. Is THERE A SUN AROUND WHICH SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONS ORBIT?
"The philosopher casts his eye over existence, and wishes to give it a
new standard value; for it has been the peculiar task of all great
thinkers to be law-givers for the weight and stamp in the mint of
reality."124 For social organizations, constitutionalism offers the promise
of providing something approaching that principle. Yet organizing
principles are personal to the organism that struggles against or accepts
them. Only the struggle remains the same-over and over. These open
systems of multiple cycles constitute the matrix within which the
hermeneutical projects of interpretation can occur and foundations can
be established, maintained, problematized, destroyed, and replaced. But
globalization and the emerging societal constitutions of nonstate actors
have contributed to the complexity of systemic cyclicity. 125
One can test the utility of this emerging understanding of the
governance frameworks of the globalized world order by considering an
example: the supply chain transparency policies of Apple Incorporated.
The object is to understand not only how Apple is not merely
self-constituted autonomously of the states in which it operates, but to
suggest the importance of communication, conflict, and catastrophe in
the process of internal and external communication with other actors.
123. M. G. SMITH, CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY 248 (1974).
124. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thoughts Out Of Season Part II: The Use And Abuse Of
History & Schopenhauer As Educator, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
VOL. II 130 (Oscar Levy, ed., Adrian Collins, M.A., trans., 1909).
125. See, e.g., Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a New
Market-Embedded Morality?, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 371 (2008) ("governance is
premised on facilitating 'private' forms of authority: corporations, trade and
technical-professional associations, accountancy and credit rating agencies, and
standard-setting organizations are all increasingly assuming regulatory roles and
intensively experimenting with novel forms of legality." Id. at 377). With these, of course,
come distinctive forms of regulation, many without the backing of the state. Id. at 378.
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The Apple example also provides a context for observing, in operation,
the dynamic element of societal constitutionalism. It suggests that both
Lindahl's spatiality and Teubner's permeability now apply within
organisms that do not stand still long enough for the theorist to
contemplate its character in motionless space. It is the elements of
motion, space, and permeability that suggest both the utility of societal
constitutionalism and its limits. It also suggests that there may be a
strong difference between state and nonstate governance constitutions.
Public law based constitutionalism, like much in Western law, posits
equilibrium as the basic state of system operation. 126 Disequilibrium is
viewed as a temporary state leading to equilibrium, which is a sign of
system integrity and success. Dynamic societal constitutionalism posits
the opposite for private governance constitutionalism-disequilibrium is
the equilibrium state. 127 Constitutional systems that are permeable,
structured within intangible borders that are constantly being redrawn,
define and redefine themselves over very short time horizons. 128
Systemic integrity is grounded in the constitutional norms within which
a governance unit is organized, but even these are connected to
frameworks of common standards shared by governance unit
stakeholders. Dynamic societal constitutionalism produces a "quick
tempo" application of public law "living constitution" norms but with the
126. See, e.g., Rolf H. Weber & Shawn Gunnarson, A Constitutional Solution for Internet
Governance, 14 COLUM. Scl. & TECH. L. REv. 1 (2013) ("Constitutional principles, binding
leaders, and stakeholders alike generally establish stability by assuring a degree of
predictability and encouraging legitimate expectations by those they govern." Id. at 63
(citing in part Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als evolutionire Errungenschaft, 9
RECHTSHISTORISCHES J., 176, 181 (1990).); Imaculada Baviera, Employment Stability In
Spanish Labor Law: Between Regulatory Tradition And Social Reality, 34 COMP. LAB. L. &
POLY J 677 ("A traditional principle in Spanish labor law is employment stability."). See
also Alexander Orakhelashvili, Legal Stability and Claims of Change: The International
Court's Treatment of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 75 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 371, 372
(2006) (with respect to state claims of legal change because of the particular circumstances
of their claims under international law, "[tihe claims of legal change attendant to such
developments contradict the idea that the legal framework must be viewed as coherent
and predictable, not liable to change at each and every instance of the exercise of power.").
127. See discussion, infra, Part III.
128. See Inger-Johanne Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to Constitutionalism,
in TRANSNAT'L GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 41 (Christian Joerges,
Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds., 2004). Cf. Boaventura de Sousa Santos,
Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14(3) J. L. & Soc.
279-302 (1987) ("different legal spaces superposed, interpenetrated and mixed," id. at
293); Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes (Feb. 2008), LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 2/2008,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091783.
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addition of the private governance dimension. 129 Apple suggests the
contours of that dynamism and the possibility of preserving system
integrity even within structures of communication, permeability, and
three-dimensional governance spaces.
A. Apple and Governance Catastrophe: A Story of Crisis and
Transformation in Three Dimensional Governance Space
Apple can be understood as a self-constituted organization existing
autonomously of any one state. 130 Its scope of authority is bounded by its
business objectives for which it is accountable to its shareholders and
consumers. Its institutional autonomy is bound up in the apparatus of
its corporate structures from which it derives its regulatory authority
through contracts within the value chain of its activities. Its aggregate
operations, assets, and markets are not completely directed by any
state, though all may be subject to the rules of any state in which Apple
chooses to operate.131 It can choose the style of its own constitution even
as it can choose the locus of the territory within which it will place
everything from its principal offices to its smallest operations. It can
also determine the form of those relationships. Lastly, within the
bounds of its authority, in the relationships with its suppliers, it has
developed an effective power to settle disputes. 132 Apple's organization
has a constitutional element-the organizing principles of its
government apparatus and the rules for the operation of the governance
power vested in this organization. The normative elements of its rule
systems are themselves grounded in standards and values that are
generally accepted 33 and reflect the value standards of its investors and
consumers. 134 These are values that Apple then shares uniformly with
its suppliers and their workers (the universe of their dependent
129. Cf. Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and
Anthropology: Some Remarks from a German Point of View, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 395,
410-16 (1994).
130. Cf. Teubner, supra note 40.
131. Generally on the jurisdictional limits of multinational regulation, see PETER
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 90-172 (1999).
132. See, e.g., We Believe in Accountability-for Our Suppliers and for Ourselves, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/auditing.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013)
(describing Apple's auditing system for enforcing its "supplier code of conduct").
133. See, e.g., Supplier Responsibility at Apple, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/supplier
responsibility/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (describing Apple's expectations with respect to
its suppliers' working conditions and environmental impacts).
134. See, e.g., Environmental Progress, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/environmentiprogr
ess/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (describing Apple's efforts to reduce its environmental
impacts).
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populations) through aggressive education and socialization
programs.135 The normative elements are grounded in legitimacy and
touch on those structures that make it possible both to "see" the
self-constituting enterprise and to treat it, both inside and outside, as
something legitimately apart from its stakeholders-that is to "feel"
it.136 Apple is structured as a system of taxonomy and legitimation that
is grounded in a set of normative assumptions about the purpose of
government and its connection to governance. Apple's constitution, then,
produces a self-referencing system whose effects and projections
outward can be felt and understood as legitimate. Its internal rules are
grounded in values that reflect behavior norms that are impersonal and
process based (the rule of law of Apple). 13 7
Apple, Inc. sits at the top of a vast supply chain through which it
conceives, designs, manufactures, assembles and distributes a large
product line to consumers' world wide.13 8 While Apple may participate
135. See When People Gain New Skills and Knowledge, They Can Improve Their Lives,
APPLE, http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/education-and-development.html (last
visited Apr. 8, 2013) (describing educational resources for workers in Apple's supply
chain).
136. See generally APPLE SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITY: 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, APPLE,
(2012), available at http://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdflApple-SR_2012_Pro
gressReport.pdf.
137. This is reflected in the construction of its Supplier Code of Conduct-the
constitutional framework of its supply chain relationships:
The Supplier Code of Conduct prohibits all types of involuntary labor,
such as slavery, indentured or bonded labor, child labor, and prison
labor. Our suppliers certify compliance with the local laws applicable
to their operations, including any slavery and human trafficking laws,
and we verify compliance by conducting rigorous audits of their
facilities. Beyond auditing, we provide our employees who are directly
responsible for supply chain management with training on involuntary
labor and human trafficking issues to reinforce our prevention efforts,
and we hold them accountable for complying with our standards.
Labor and Human Rights, APPLE, originally available at http://www.apple.com/supplier
responsibility/code-of-conduct/labor-and-human-rights.html, now cached at http://fireballe
d.org/linked/2012/03/20/monthly-reporting/ (last visited July 12, 2013) (describing Apple's
efforts to prohibit practices that threaten the rights of workers, even when local laws and
customs permit such practices relating specifically to indentured migrant labor).
138. In its 2012 Annual Report in SEC Form 10K, Apple stated:
Substantially all of the Company's hardware products are
manufactured by outsourcing partners that are located primarily in
Asia. A significant concentration of this manufacturing is currently
performed by a small number of outsourcing partners, often in single
locations. Certain of these outsourcing partners are the sole-sourced
suppliers of components and manufacturers for many of the Company's
products. Although the Company Works closely with its outsourcing
partners on manufacturing schedules, the Company's operating results
could be adversely affected if its outsourcing partners were unable to
meet their production commitments. The Company's purchase
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directly in parts of this chain of production, it has outsourced much of
its production to other autonomous enterprises. Apple had long operated
its own corporate social responsibility governance system through its
supply chain. 13 9 The constitution of this regulatory system was the
Apple Supplier Code of Conduct. 140 The Code itself is grounded in
international hard and soft law, much of which has not been transposed
into the domestic law of the United States, much less the domestic law
of host states in which suppliers may be operating.141 Unlike other
multinational corporations with large supply chain operations, Apple
has not moved to incorporate within its international governance much
of the governance systems developed by international organs-and
specifically those of the U.N. Global Compact, and the Guiding
Principles.142 Nor did it embrace third party nonstate (private sector)
corporate social responsibility (CSR) related reporting efforts, such as
commitments typically cover its requirements for periods up to 150
days.
Annual Report Form 10K 2012, APPLE, INC. at 7, available at http://files.shareholder.com/
downloads/AAPL/2589956175xOxS1193125-12-444068/320193/filing.pdf.
139. See APPLE, supra note 136, at 3 ("Our suppliers must live up to Apple's Supplier
Code of Conduct as a condition of doing business with us. Drawing on internationally
recognized standards, our Code lays out Apple's expectations in the areas of labor and
human rights, worker health and safety, the environmental impact, ethics, and
management systems. We insist that our manufacturing partners follow this Code, and we
make sure they do by conducting rigorous audits with the help of independent experts.").
A more detailed analysis is the subject of Section II.B., infra.
140. Apple Supplier Code of Conduct, APPLE INC., available at http://www.apple.com/
supplierresponsibility/pdflAppleSupplierCode-ofLConduct.pdf. Though the Supplier
Code was structured as part of the contractual relations between Apple and its suppliers,
it was essentially regulatory in nature. "Apple requires that Suppliers implement this
Code using the management systems described below. Apple may visit (and/or have
external monitors visit) Supplier facilities, with or without notice, to assess compliance
with this Code and to audit Supplier's wage, hour, payroll, and other worker records and
practices. Violations of this Code may result in immediate termination as an Apple
Supplier and in legal action" Id.
141. This produces a communicative cyclidity at the heart of the embeddedness of
societally constituted economic "territories" like that overseen by Apple, and traditional
public regulatory space. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 40, at 634-35.
142. It should be noted though that these are offered usually as frameworks around
which conduct expectation can be drawn, rather than as fully developed regulatory
standards. For example, the FAQs of the Global Compact suggest, "The Global Compact is
not a code of conduct. Rather, it offers a policy framework for organizing and developing
corporate sustainability strategies while offering a platform-based on universal
principles-to encourage innovative initiatives and partnerships with civil society,
governments and other stakeholders." FAQs, Why should a company that has already
established its own code of conduct participate in the Global Compact?, U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT, at 6, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/faq.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2013). Others, like the OECD Guidelines, are developed as more
regulatory in structure.
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the systems offered through GRI. 148 Instead, Apple sought to create and
maintain internally developed reporting and behavior standards. This
unique regulatory code was developed with reference to a number of
international public and private standards, 144 but reflected the way in
which inter-systemic structural coupling both opens self-constituted
social systems to other systems, and the way in which those
communications are filtered and absorbed to preserve systemic
integrity.
The Code specifies behavior standards and expectations in the areas
of labor, human rights, worker health/safety, environmental impact,
ethics, and management. 145 Apple reports the results of its monitoring
in an annual Apple Supplier Responsibility Progress Report.146 These
reports suggest the working of an autonomous self-constituted system of
regulatory governance built around Apple and it suppliers, investors,
and consumers, who play a central role, supported by nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) and the media, 147 framed within the economic
activities of Apple's business. But the engine for regulatory movement is
triggered by constant communication that in its most transformative
aspects take on the character of Teubner's collisions, 148 within a the
context of polycentric spatial jurisdictions, as Lindahl describes. 149
143. The Global Reporing Initiative "is a non-profit organization that works towards a
sustainable global economy by providing sustainability reporting guidance. " See About
Us, GRI, available at https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-grilwhat-is-
GRI/Pages/default.aspx.
144. The Apple Supplier Code provides that it
is modeled on and contains language from the Electronic Industry
Code of Conduct. Recognized standards such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and standards issued by
organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO),
Social Accountability International (SAI), and the Ethical Trading
Initiative (ETI) were used as references in preparing this Code and
may be useful sources of additional information. A complete list of
references is provided at the end of this Code. As an extension of the
Code, Apple maintains a series of detailed Standards that clarify our
expectations for compliance
Apple Suppler Code of Conduct, APPLE INC., at 1, available at http://images.apple.com/
supplierresponsibility/pdflAppleSupplierCodeof_.Conduct.pdf (last visited Sept. 15,
2013). The Supplier Code of Conduct lists most of the well-known international public and
private sources of standards of business conduct. Id. at 7-8.
145. See Supplier Responsibility at Apple, supra note 133.
146. APPLE, supra note 136. The 2012 Report includes the results of its audits (a private
regulatory function within voluntary code systems). Earlier reports are also available at
the Apple website.
147. Teubner, supra note 118, at 204.
148. See discussion, Part III, infra.
149. Id.
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Apple retained sole responsibility for monitoring compliance with its
Code and for remediating breaches and assessing sanctions.1 50 Before
January 2012 Apple consistently resisted pressure to disclose the
environmental impact of their manufacturing process or open their
supplier factories to auditors.15 1 Indeed, Apple's secrecy regarding its
manufacturing and supplier arrangements has attracted media
attention in the wake of recent violent incidents at Apple supplier
factories in China and other Asian countries. 152 In response to an early
criticism by Greenpeace demanding greater transparency regarding the
use of toxic chemicals in Apple products, a letter was published, signed
by former Apple CEO Steve Jobs, providing limited details of Apple's
internal efforts to reduce and remove toxic substances from its
products. 153 This was part of the emergence of a more public and
comprehensive CSR effort by Apple, 154 demonstrated by the publication
on its website of a variety of different documents that instituted
elements of independently governed transparency systems, while
reassuring Apple shareholders that the corporation could safely and
ethically monitor its own practices. 155 In subsequent years, Apple has
gradually expanded and changed its online CSR documentation,
frequently disclosing additional procedures and imitating additional
external standards to respond to different emerging criticism of the
environmental and employment practices of its industrial suppliers and
150. The Supplier Code of Conduct permits Apple the power to monitor, assess and
inspect suppliers for compliance. APPLE, supra note 136. It has the power to terminate its
relationship with suppliers for violation of their Supplier Code and it compelled suppliers
to "have a process for timely correction of any deficiencies identified by an internal or
external audit, assessment, inspection, investigation, or review." Id. at 7.
151. "We continue to revise our Code based on our experience of auditing our suppliers
and through discussions with stakeholder groups." Apple Supplier Responsibility 2010
Progress Report, APPLE INC., at 6, available at http://images.apple.com/supplier
responsibility/pdf/Apple SR_2010_ProgressReport.pdf. This suggests the operation of a
tightly woven self-referencing communication cycle that is permeable but that has
constituted itself independently of other governance structures with which it might also
communicate. See Teubner, supra note 49.
152. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into
an IPad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/i eco
nomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
153. See Jim Dalrymple, Steve Jobs Outlines Plans for 'a Greener Apple', MACWORLD
(May 2, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.macworld.com/article/57680/2007/05/greenapple.htm
1.
154. See Steve Jobs, A Greener Apple, APPLE (May 2, 2007), http://images.apple.com/hot
news/agreenerapple/docs/A GreenerApple.pdf.
155. See Supplier Responsibility at Apple, supra note 133.
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manufacturing partners. 15 6 Although this material is now being
supplanted by third-party oversight, Apple's self-managed corporate
governance reporting is educational about the potential advantages and
risks facing companies that choose a "go-it-alone" approach.1 57
The system worked reasonably well, but Apple, like other large
multinational corporations, is vulnerable to reputation damage among
consumers and investors in developed states.15 8 For Apple, that
vulnerability was mediated by a regimen of internal transparency
(between Apple and its suppliers) but external barriers to information.
Before 2012, Apple had resisted any effort to mesh its corporate social
responsibility regulatory frameworks with those developed by private or
public actors. One of these is the Fair Labor Association (FLA), which
describes itself as "a nonprofit organization dedicated to ending
sweatshop conditions in factories worldwide." 5 9 It seeks to meet this
goal by "bringing together multiple stakeholders, calling for greater
accountability and transparency from manufacturers, factories and
others involved in global supply chains, and creating lasting solutions to
exploitative labor practices."160 Key to the work of FLA is the
collaborative development of standards and the enforcement of a system
of monitoring and reporting (transparency) of compliance. "FLA
Participating Companies . .. commit to promoting and complying with
international labor standards throughout their supply chains[,]" both in
the U.S. and overseas.16 Transparency and reporting are the the keys
to the operation of this system. Companies that join the FLA commit to
establishing internal systems for monitoring workplace conditions and
maintaining Code standards, being part of a rigorous system of
Independent External Monitoring (IEM), and public reporting on the
conditions in their supplier factories. To ensure transparency, the
results of the IEM audits are published on the FLA Web site in the form
156. These changes are reflected in Apple's Supplier Responsibility Progress Reports. A
link to historical Reports is provided on the Apple website at http://www.apple.com/
supplierresponsibility/reports.html.
157. Another prominent example of the advantages of internal CSR practices is
Wal-Mart, a company whose market leverage, emerging in part from its CSR
development, has spawned an academic literature of its own. See, e.g., Yu Xiaomin & Pun
Ngai, Walmartization, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Labor Standards of Toy
Factories in South China, in WALMART IN CHINA 54 (Anita Chan ed., 2011).
158. See, e.g., Edmund R. Gray, and John M.T. Balmer, Managing Corporate Image and
Corporate Reputation, 31(5) LONG RANGE PLANNING 649-802 (October 1998).
159. FAIR LAB. Ass'N, http://oldsite.fairlabor.org/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
160. Id.
161. Accreditation, FAIR LAB. AsS'N, http://www.fairlabor.org/accreditation (last visited
Apr. 8, 2013).
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of tracking charts.162 But it was precisely to avoid the convergence of
regulatory systems, and preserve the autonomy and control of its
regulatory environment, within its supply chain, that probably
accounted for Apple's proprietary approach to its own self-constitution.
Though those structures were deeply enmeshed with other structures of
business conduct, they remained separated from those developed by
Apple.
Apple, Inc. also did not mesh its corporate social responsibility
regimes with those of its downstream suppliers, irrespective of their size
or power. One of them is Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd.163
Operating as Foxconn Technology Group ("Foxconn"), the company
describes itself as "the most dependable partner for joint-design,
joint-development, manufacturing, assembly and after-sales services to
global Computer, Communication and Consumer-electronics ("3C")
leaders. Aided by its legendary green manufacturing execution,
uncompromising customer devotion and its award-winning proprietary
business model, eCMMS, Hon Hai has been the most trusted name in
contract manufacturing services (including CEM, EMS, ODM and
CMMS) in the world."l64 By 2012, Foxconn had grown into one of the
largest corporate enterprises on earth. 165 In addition to its work for
others, Han HailFoxconn manufactures a substantial number of Apple
products for sale and distribution elsewhere. 66
162. What We Do, FAIR LAB. Ass'N, http://oldsite.fairlabor.org/whatwedo.html (last
visited Apr. 8, 2013).
163. A website profile is available at http://www.foxconn.com/indexEn.html. The
Company explains that it is "Guided by a belief that the electronics products would be an
integral part of everyday life in every office and in every home, Terry Gou founded Hon
Hai Precision Industry Company Ltd., the anchor company of Hon HailFoxconn
Technology Group in 1974 with US$7,500, a devotion in integrating expertise for
mechanical and electrical parts and an uncommon concept to provide the lowest 'total cost'
solution to increase the affordability of electronics products for all mankind." Group
Profile, HON HAI/FoxCONN, available at
http://www.foxconn.com/GroupProfileEn/GroupProfile.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
164. Group Profile, HON HAI/FOXCONN, supra note 164.
165. Foxconn reported that for 2012, it was ranked 43rd among Fortune Global 500 and
156th among Forbes Global 2000. See HON HAI/FOXCONN, Company Milestones, available
at http://www.foxconn.com/GroupProfile-En/CompanyMilestones.html (last visited Sept.
15, 2013).
166. "The Taiwan-based company is known as the world's largest electronics supplier,
and also counts HP, Microsoft, Sony and other major tech vendors as its clients. Apple,
however, makes up 40% to 50% of the company's revenues, according to analysts. Hon Hai
helps build Apple's iPhone, iPad, iPod and Mac devices." Michael Kan, Apple Supplier Hon
Hai Earns Record Annual Profit, COMPUTERLAND, Mar. 25, 2013, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9237884/Apple-supplierHonHai-earns-record_
annualprofit.
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Like other large companies, Foxconn had also developed its own
autonomous corporate social responsibility philosophy, which it has
institutionalized through policy. 167 Like Apple's policies, it was based
largely on the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) Code of
Conduct, 168 covering labor, social, and environmental issues. 69
Foxconn's CSR policies are made applicable to all aspects of its
operationso70 and are integrated into its management structure. 171
Foxconn has made available CSR Reports for the years 2008-2011 on its
website.172 Foxconn's 2008 CSR Report recognized the importance of
CSR issues in the organization of corporate operations and the critical
role that social actors played in the development of CSR structures and
operations. 173 Foxconn's vision consists of three parts, all of which
167. SER Introduction, HON HAI/FOXCONN, available at http://ser.foxconn.com/Introduc
tionShow.do.
Codes set out in this CoC policy were derived from three disciplined
sources which are: a) the member obligations of the industrial
associations and the EICC of which Foxconn is a member, and the
international standard institutes to which Foxconn's business is
related; b) the laws covering national regions where Foxconn deploys
operations; and c) the internal leadership of Foxconn who determine
voluntary upgrading of performance standards.
SER CoC, HON HAI/FOXCONN, available at http://ser.foxconn.com/GroupCocShow.do (last
visited Sept. 15, 2013).
168. "Foxconn has been a member of the EICC since 2005. Foxconn established its SER
committee to manage corporate social and environmental responsibility. Foxconn has
released its own SER code of conduct, which is equivalent to the EICC CoC, to promote
SER management." SER Introduction, supra note 167.
169. HON HAI/FOxcONN, SER Policy, SER Statement, available at http://ser.foxconn.com
/PolicyShow.do (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
170. Foxconn states on its website:
Foxconn incorporates SER into everyday business to insure health and
safety, employee's rights and benefits, and environmental protection
are fully implemented throughout the company. Foxconn's SER
committee has set up a management system which complies with
international standards, national laws, regulations, and customer
requirements for the company's development and sustainable
improvement
SER Policy, SER Statement, supra note 170.
171. See SER Organization, HON HAIFOxCONN, available at http://ser.foxconn.com/Org
DescShow.do (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
172. CSR Annual Report, HON HAI/FoXcONN, available at http://ser.foxconn.com/View
AnuReport.do?action=showAnnual (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
173. "In 2007, Foxconn Technology Group established the Foxconn Global SER
Committee (FGSC) to proactively work with stakeholders including customers,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other interested groups on CSER issues. As
a result of the committee's work, we have implemented a wide range of initiatives to
improve our performance across the spectrum of corporate responsibility issues. Our
progress on these issues is outlined in this report." 2008 Corporate Social and
Environmental Responsibility Report (2008), FOXCONN TECH. GROUP, at 28, available at
839
840 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
together emphasize a commitment to harmony for the profit of the
company and the benefit of its stakeholders. 174 Despite its substantial
CSR programs and reports, there is no indication that either Han Hai or
Apple took any steps to mesh their respective CSR programs. From
Apple's perspective, Han HailFoxconn was contractually obligated to
conform its operations to Apple's Supplier Code of Conduct. From Han
HailFoxconn's perspective, its CSR program might be harmonized with
that of Apple, but in any case, its workers would be subject to its own
CSR policies, perhaps overlain with those of Apple, the law
international law norms overlay the structures of a state's domestic
legal order.175 Together, each served as an irritant to the other in the
management of the supplier related operations of Han Hain/Foxconn.
Both have been in communication (structurally coupled) with
transnational private and public actors from which their respective CSR
policies were derived. Lastly, each was deeply embedded in networks in
which both states and private actors sought to monitor corporate
compliance with their respective codes, supported in part by media
supported by consumers ands investors who derive information about
http://ser.foxconn.com/downloadAttachment/8abe98dc3c5f940a013c84daf0240241/2008+Fo
xconn+CSER+Annual+Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
174. The Company has developed a specific philosophy:
"Since 1974, Hon HailFoxconn had always been guided by three
Foxconnian visions; Through the most efficient "Total Cost
Advantages" to make comfort of electronic products usage an
attainable reality for all mankind; Through the proprietary one-stop
shopping vertical integrated eCMMS model to revolutionize the
conventional inefficient electronics outsourcing model; Through the
devotion to greater social harmony and higher ethical standards to
achieve a win-win model for all stakeholders including shareholders,
employees, community and management.
About Foxconn, Business Philosophy, FOXCONN, available at http://www.foxconn.com/
GroupProfileEn/BusinessPhilosophy.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
175. This relationship produced substantial differences in worker treatment even within
Foxconn's Factory. A 2012 civil society report noted:
Interviews have revealed that workers who make Apple electronics
make more money than those who work on other brands' products,
though this certainly is related to how many overtime hours are
worked. In our investigation, we came to learn that wages can be very
different even over the same work time since workers make different
brands of products. For example, in interviewing two workers from
different cell phone departments who were working the same hours,
the worker producing cell phones for a small brand-name company was
earning only 2,500 RMB ($397) per month, while the Apple worker
earned 3,200 RMB ($508).
Beyond Foxconn: Deplorable Working Conditions Characterize Apple's Entire Supply
Chain, CHINA LABOR WATCH, 92-93 (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.chinalabor
watch.org/pdf/2012627-5.pdf.
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corporate compliance from these sources to aid them in their
consumption and investment decisions.176
All of this would have remained a theoretical curiosity but for a
series of shocks that occurred between 2006 and 2012 and that, by
overwhelming Apple and Foxconn's CSR systems, threatened the
foundations of their societal constitutions. In 2006, reports began to
surface in the international press about terrible working conditions at
Apple's supplier plants in China. Apple pledged a greater focus on
monitoring and remediation. There was little more until 2010, when the
wake of a long string of suicides by workers protesting working
conditions at Han HailFoxconn's Shenzhen factories brought
international attention to multiple layers of CSR standards that did not
seem to work.177 The negative impact on Apple's image and Foxconn's
reputation was immediate and substantial.178 "Foxconn says it is at its
wits' end as to how to tackle the problem, and has even drafted in a
Buddhist monk to try to purge its factories of evil spirits."179 Apple's
initial reaction, after the successful suicides of twelve employees at the
Foxconn Shenzhen plant, was more offensive.180 Foxconn's approach was
176. Cf. Larry Cati Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of
Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1739 (2007).
177. The Economist reported:
Apple was expecting lots of publicity ahead of the international release
of the iPad, its latest gadget, on May 28th-but not the sort it received
in Hong Kong this week, which included the ritual burning of pictures
of iPhones and calls for a global boycott. The protests were triggered by
a series of suicides of employees of Foxconn, a subsidiary of Taiwan's
Hon Hai Precision Industry Company, the world's largest "contract
manufacturer."
Light and Death: Suicides at Foxconn, EcONOMIST, May 27, 2010, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/16231588.
178. Id.
179. Malcolm Moore, What Has Triggered the Suicide Cluster at Foxconn, TELEGRAPH,
May 16, 2010, available at http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/malcolmmoore/100039883/
what-has-triggered-the-suicide-cluster-at-foxconn/.
180. See Claudine Beaumont, Foxconn Suicide Rate is Lower Than in the US, Says
Apple's Steve Jobs, TELEGRAPH, June 2, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk
/technology/steve-jobs/77965461Foxconn-suicide-rate-is-lower-than-in-the-US-says-Apples-
Steve-Jobs.html.
Jobs said Apple was "on top" of the situation, and that the company
took its corporate and social responsibilities seriously. "We are all over
this," he told delegates at the D8 technology conference in California.
"We look at everything at these companies, and I can tell you a few
things that we know: Foxconn is not a sweatshop. It's a factory, but
they have restaurants and movie theatres. They've had some suicides
and attempted suicides. They have 400,000 people there. The rate is
under what the US rate is, but it's still troubling." Jobs said that there
had been a spate of copycat suicides in Palo Alto, his hometown, and
that Apple was working hard to get to the root of problems at Foxconn.
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more measured. "Foxconn Technology Group Chairman Terry Gou
bowed deeply several times and apologized but also cautioned there was
only so much his company could do." 181 Foxconn also consulted with
mental health professionals. 182 By November 2010, Reuters was
reporting that "the company has pledged to improve work conditions,
increase pay, reduce overtime hours and build a string of giant new
manufacturing complexes in inland provinces such as Henan to allow
workers to live closer to home, and tap cheaper labor costs."183 It also
sought to limit suicides by requiring employees to pledge not to kill
themselves.184 Foxconn also installed anti-suicide nets.185 But efforts
were to no avail. By November 2010, two more workers had successfully
committed suicide.186 Throughout the year, Foxconn insisted it had
acted within the requirements of law and its own policies. However, a
civil society actor, China Watch, reported on the death of another
worker, suggested serious violations of Chinese law, Foxconn's CSR
policies, and Apple's Supplier Code.' 87 Some reports traced violations
"We're trying to understand this, we have people over there," he told
delegates.
Id.
181. Chinese Factory Asks For 'No Suicide' Vow, NBC NEWS, May 26, 2010, available at
http://www.nbenews.com/id/37354853/ns/business-world-business/?ns=business-
world business#.UeiuM7y9zu4. ("I'm very concerned about this. I can't sleep every night,'
said Gou, one of Taiwan's best known businessmen. 'From a scientific point of view, I'm
not confident we can stop every case. But, as a responsible employer, we have to take up
the responsibility of preventing as many as we can."').
182. Id. ("Foxconn was consulting with a large group of mental health professionals who
have been reviewing the company's personnel records.")
183. Foxconn Worker Plunges to Death at China Plant: Report, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/05/us-china-foxconn-death-idUSTRE6
A41M920101105.
184. Chinese Factory Asks For 'No Suicide' Vow, supra note 182 ("Foxconn International
Holdings Ltd., one of Apple's Chinese manufacturers, is asking its employees to sign a
pledge that they will not kill themselves as the company tries to control the damage from
a spate of suicides among its work force.").
185. See Eliot Von Buskirk, Foxconn Rallies Workers, Leaves Suicide Nets in Place
(Updated), WIRED.COM, Aug. 18, 2010, available at http://www.wired.com/business/2010/
08/foxconn-rallies-workers-installs-suicide-nets/.
186. Foxconn Worker Plunges to Death at China Plant: Report, supra note 184.
187. "According to Yan Li's family and Foxconn colleagues, because of the rapid
turnaround time for many production orders, Yan Li often worked throughout the night.
At one point, according to his family, Yan Li worked for almost 35 hours non-stop, from
7AM on May 24, to 5:47 PM on May 25. Even after leaving work on May 25, he still
received calls from his superiors, making it impossible for him to rest." Another Foxconn
Employee Died of Fatigue, CHINA LABOR WATCH, June 3, 2010, available at http://www.
chinalaborwatch.org/pro/proshow-96.html.
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back several years before 2010.18s By the end of 2010, the employee
suicides and their connection with Apple were widely reported in large
circulation Western media in the United States and Europe, and
tellingly, in ways that appeared to affect consumer and investor
judgment about Apple. 189 In its 2011 Apple Supplier Responsibility
Report, 190 Apple reported:
Recognizing that we would need additional expertise to
help prevent further tragedies, we launched an
international search for the most knowledgeable suicide
prevention specialists-particularly those with
experience in China-and asked them to advise Apple
and Foxconn. . . . Apple then commissioned an
independent review by a broader team of suicide
prevention experts. This team was asked to conduct a
deeper investigation into the suicides, evaluate
Foxconn's response, and recommend strategies for
supporting workers' mental health in the future. 191
Apple pledged to "continue to work with Foxconn through the
implementation of these programs, and we plan to take key learnings
from this engagement to other facilities in our supply base."192 But the
suicides continued, in lesser number through 2013. By the end of 2011,
the media attention to Apple and the Foxconn suicides had moved from
the United Kingdom to important mainstream media in the United
States. Though Apple was able to deflect criticism by an important
media critic for verification failures, on the program "This American
188. For prior reports, see We Are Extremely Tired, With Tremendous Pressure, A
Follow-Up Investgation of FoxConn, CHINA LABOR WATCH, May 18, 2010, available at
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/pro/proshow-100.html; Foxconn Tragedy Underscores
Labor Violations, Lack of Respect, CHINA LABOR WATCH, July 23, 2009, available at
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/articles/2010_05_18/20090723foxconn.php; Follow Up On
Foxconn, CHINA LABOR WATCH, Aug. 28, 2008, available at http://www.chinalaborwatch.
orglarticles/2008 08 28/index.php.
189. See, e.g., Andrew Malone & Richard Jones, Revealed: Inside the Chinese Suicide
Sweatshop Where Workers Toil in 34-Hour Shifts to Make Your iPod, DAILY MAIL (UK),
June 11, 2010, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1285980/Revealed-
Inside-Chinese-suicide-sweatshop-workers-toil-34-hour-shifts-make-
iPod.html#ixzz2ZSXsXCmc.
190. Apple Supplier Responsibility Report 2011, APPLE INC., available at http://images.
apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdflAppleSR_2011-ProgressReport.pdf (last visited Aug. 17,
2013).
191. Id. at 18.
192. Id. at 19.
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Life,"193 reports published in the New York Times were harder to
counter. 194 Apple was quick to respond, denying the charges and
restating its commitment to the integrity of its regulatory system. 95
Still, the global attention and the monitoring of Apple's
administration of its supplier responsibility system appeared to require
more than the usual responses and investigations. The systemic
integrity of Apple's societally constituted governance framework had
reached crisis.
The same month the episode aired, The New York Times
ran a front-page investigative series about Apple's
overseas manufacturing, and there were news reports
about Foxconn workers threatening group suicide in a
protest over their treatment. Faced with all this scrutiny
of its manufacturing practices, Apple announced that for
the first time it will allow an outside third party to audit
working conditions at those factories and-for the first
time ever-it released a list of its suppliers. 96
193. In a recent and highly publicized example, the "weekly public radio program This
American Life' said on Friday that it was retracting a critical report about Apple's suppliers in
China because the storyteller, Mike Daisey, had embellished details in the narrative." See
Brian Stelter, This American Life Retracts Episode on Apple's Suppliers in China, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2012, available at http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com /2012/03/16/this-american-
life-retracts-episode-on-apples-suppliers-in-chinal ("The program's host, Ira Glass, said in a
statement that Mr. Daisey 'lied' to him and to Brian Reed, a producer of the program, about
details related to injured workers Mr. Daisey had described meeting at Foxconn, a factory in
China where Apple products are made"). The original podcast had proven to be popular. See
Charles Arthur, This American Life Withdraws Damning Apple Episode, THE GUARDIAN, Mar.
16, 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/mar/16/foxconn-ipad-daisey-
npr-retraction.
194. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg and David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built Into an
iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/
business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-
china.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0. ("Problems are as varied as onerous work environments and
serious-sometimes deadly--safety problems. Employees work excessive overtime, in some
cases seven days a week, and live in crowded dorms. Some say they stand so long that their
legs swell until they can hardly walk. Under-age workers have helped build Apple's products,
and the company's suppliers have improperly disposed of hazardous waste and falsified records,
according to company reports and advocacy groups that, within China, are often considered
reliable, independent monitors." Id.).
195. Tim Cook Responds To Foxconn Worker Abuse Report: Apple Not Turning 'Blind
Eye', REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/27/tim-
cook-foxconn n 1237341.html.
196. This American Life Withdraws Damning Apple Episode, supra note 193.
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On January 13, 2012, Apple disclosed an almost complete list of its
direct suppliers for the first time and announced their new membership
in the Fair Labor Association.197 This shift in policy may reflect a
number of realities-the recent loss of a charismatic and famously
willful executive, a capitulation to skepticism from NGOs and investors
about the validity of autonomous reporting, or an actual shift of internal
corporate culture. The FLA will, like any third party CSR organization,
impose its own requirements and image upon Apple's supply chain,
limiting its corporate autonomy. 198 Despite this fact, future FLA reports
will exist alongside Apple's own reporting and policy statements. 9 9
FLA is not the only NGO with which Apple sought to partner after
2012. Their website also explains: "We've invited the Institute of Public
and Environmental Affairs (IPE) and other environmental groups to
work with us on specialized audits. We're also continuing our work with
Verit6, a non-governmental organization (NGO) focused on ensuring fair
working conditions, to develop new strategies for worker-management
communication." 200 These enterprises are retained for the same
legitimacy enhancing function as FLA20 1-they assure outsiders,
197. Stanley James & Adam Satariano, Apple Opens Suppliers' Doors to Labor Group
After Foxconn Worker Suicides, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2012-01-13/apple-opens-suppliers-doors-to-labor-group-after-foxconn-
worker-suicides.html. The FLA Press Release noted: "that Apple will join the FLA as a
Participating Company, effective immediately. The FLA will independently assess
facilities in Apple's supply chain and report detailed findings on the FLA website." Apple
Joins FLA, FLA, Jan. 14, 2012, available at http://www.fairlabor.org/blog/entry/apple-
joins-fla.
198. Apple Joins FLA, supra note 197. ("FLA Participating Companies agree to uphold the
FLA Workplace Code of Conduct throughout their supply chains and commit to the FLA's
Principles of Fair Labor and Responsible Sourcing.").
199. Thus, Apple continues its practice of producing Supplier Responsibility Progress
Reports grounded on its own autonomous Supplier Conduct Code, while the Fair Labor
Association simultaneously generates reports of its monitoring activities of Apple that are
based on its own third-party standards.
200. 2013 Supplier Responsibility Progress Report, Our Commitment to Transparency,
APPLE, INC., available at http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/reports.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2013).
201. The importance of the legitimacy-enhancing function of the Apple regulatory
system is highlighted in the 2013 Apple Supplier Responsibility Progress Report:
To hold ourselves accountable, we reference a variety of external
sources including the IPE pollution database, which highlights
suppliers with environmental citations by local regulatory agencies in
China. This is an additional resource to assess the risk of our suppliers
and target our focused environmental audits. In 2012, we completed 55
focused environmental audits-a 293 percent increase over 2011. Of
the 55 sites, 26 were cited in the IPE database.
Apple Supplier Responsibility 2013 Report, APPLE, INC., at 27, available at http://images.
apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/AppleSR_2013 Progress Report.pdf (last visited
Sept. 15, 2013).
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principally consumers and investors, of the integrity of Apple's efforts at
enforcing its own regulatory structures and thus at strengthening at the
operational level, the cohesion of its control. 202 At the same time, these
couplings also require Apple to bend its regulatory structures to
conform, at least to some extent, with the standards of the third-party
certification entities.
Thus, although Apple was able to use the weight of its CSR policies
to limit the consequences of early scandals, 203 crisis produced
substantial change that both produced a more permeable
societally-constituted governance system, but also one that retained its
internal coherence. However, the lasting effects of seemingly
unrelenting publicity from 2010 forward and the attention by mass
media and third party groups demonstrated that the legitimacy issues
that faced Apple also would be felt, in almost equal measure, by third
party certification partners, who themselves have become subject to
scrutiny. 204 At present, the company's previous reliance on autonomous
reporting practices may have had the long-term effect of reducing its
ability to manage its broader corporate image autonomously of the
systems with which it is intermeshed. But that price has purchased
coherence and preserved system integrity. Independent reporting
practices can appear to provide a company with an appealing set of
central and secondary advantages, but they do not reflect the realities of
system operations embedded in a world of intermeshed systems that
must satisfy the desires of multiple audiences or respond rapidly to
optics problems when something goes wrong.
Thus, crisis, and the possibility of catastrophe (in the form of the
attacks on the integrity of Apple's societally-constituted supply chain
governance structures) moved Apple from a self-contained system with
fairly limited structural coupling, to one in which its constituted
202. The 2013 Supplier Responsibility Progress Report explains:
We look for environmental issues at many supplier levels, often
confronting serious issues deep within our supply chain. But we know
that risks are not the same for all suppliers. So we target high-risk
suppliers for an additional layer of scrutiny with our focused
environmental audits, and we work with them to lessen their impacts.
To ensure our standards and our approach reflect material
environmental issues, we work with independent organizations such
as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Institute of Public and
Environmental Affairs (IPE).
Id. at 27.
203. Larry CatA Backer, Apple, Inc, the FLA and the Governance of Supplier Labor
Standards Beyond the State, Law at the End of the Day, Jan. 17, 2012, available at
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/apple-inc-fla-and-governance-of.html.
204. Steven Greenhouse, Critics Question Record of Monitor Selected by Apple, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 14, 2012, at B1.
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structures are now intermeshed with those of its suppliers (Foxconn's
CSR policy structures), with externally constituted standard-making
and monitoring organisms, while remaining connected with the
regulatory systems of the states in which they operate and the
international standard setting bodies form which they continue to draw
their own norms. Apple's regulatory structures are now more porous
and flexible within a polycentric context in which its governance is one
of several simultaneously operative layers all in dynamic flux. We move
here from two-dimensional to three-dimensional simultaneous cyclidity.
B. Systemic Stress and Resilience: A First Level Analysis
Apple's response to crisis and the resilience of its regulatory system
exhibit all of the elements of self-constitution, and of the intermeshing
whose presence is best exposed under conditions of catastrophic stress.
Apple's constitutional system is both self-referencing and autonomy
enhancing. It sits in a space other than that occupied by states or other
governance organizations. Yet, it is also wholly enmeshed in systems of
communication (structurally coupled) of other governance organs where
its "territory" overlaps. The effects of that communication on Apple's
internal rulemaking, and the effect of these inward projects on outward
solidification of legitimacy of the Apple structure were well illustrated
in the Foxconn crisis.
The result is interesting in several respects. First, it suggests the
growing markets for CSR governance. Second, it also illustrates the
increasingly important role of NGOs in the development of standards
and their monitoring and enforcement-functions once thought central
to the role of states. Third, it evidences the economics of CSR
enforcement, at least in some areas. Apple became an accredited
enterprise within the FLA family because it made economic sense to do
so-that indicates both the lower costs of FLA overseeing compliance
and the benefits of belonging to a wider group of enterprises and NGOs
that have developed and are adhering to common social norm (soft law
voluntary) standards.
The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen a dramatic
growth in the depth and sophistication of governance systems beyond
law that focus on the regulation of the labor policy of downstream
enterprises in multinational supply chains. 205 One of the markers of
205. "Such [employer generated] instruments establish private contract-like
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with international labor standards,
obligating multinational corporations and sometimes also other private businesses within
the multinational's supply chain." Marley S. Weiss, International Labor and Employment
Law: From Periphery to Core, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 500-01 (2010). "Generally,
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that growth is the rise of enterprises, the objects of which are to both
develop normative governance frameworks and provide a space for
monitoring compliance. 206 Many of these monitoring mechanisms are
product or process certification programs managed by civil society
elements.207
Related to product certification programs, these standards
evaluators have become powerful mechanisms to enforce the private
ordering governance derived from the adoption of voluntary codes of
behavior by multinational enterprises. "In the not-for-profit field both
accreditation and certification have been undertaken by self-regulatory
organizations, which have promulgated standards and developed
certification or accreditation mechanisms to evaluate compliance by
other organizations with the standards." 208 Beyond product certification,
process certification has provided NGOs with a new and more
institutionalized role in the application of governance standards among
communities of enterprises that have adopted them. 209
Organizations like FLA institutionalize transparency mechanisms
so that markets for information and disclosure can arise-producing
reference to supply chains in CSR reports is on the increase, although it was found that
approximately half of the major multinationals omit reference to their suppliers." Guy
Mundlak & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison Of Corporate Codes In The
Fields Of Labor And Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 603, 626 n.46 (2011).
Supply chain management in the context of corporate social responsibility generally, and
the human rights effects of business activity specifically, has become the subject of
important soft law regulatory structures. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 97;
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights &
Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework,
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie),
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/medialdocuments/ruggie/ruggie-
guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf.
206. See, e.g., Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10
BUFFALO ENVTL. L.J. 213 (2001). This has been criticized as permitting what is now called
"greenwashing"-the use of third party certification organizations to cover standards
violations by large enterprises. See, e.g., Jacob Vos, Note, Actions Speak Louder than
Words: Greenwashing in Corporate America, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
673 (2009).
207. See, e.g., Fabrice Etil6 & Sabrina Teyssier, Signaling Corporate Social
Responsibility: Third-Party Certification vs. Brands, ALISS Working Paper 2012-06 (Sept.
2012). See also Backer, supra note 203.
208. CATHERINE SHEA & SANDRA SITAR, INT'L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAw, NGO
ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION: THE WAY FORWARD? AN EVALUATION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY'S EXPERIENCE 7 (2005), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdL
docsJPNADB766.pdf. The standards are frequently developed through a participatory process
in which many stakeholders are consulted.
209. See generally Janet Dine, Democratization: The Contribution of Fair Trade and
Ethical Trading Movements, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 177 (2008).
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similar disclosure products for consumption by investors and consumers
to guide their purchase and investment decisions. 210 This system
provides a viable approach to transnational governance without the
need for states. Effectively, FLA contributes to making soft law
functionally hard while it retains its character, within public law
frameworks, as soft.211 While accredited companies lose autonomy in the
construction and application of voluntary codes throughout their supply
chain, they gain a certain legitimacy by adhering to the collaborative
standard-setting and transparency-facilitating outside institutions.
Accredited companies can outsource enforcement while retaining a
substantial stake in the development of both the standards to be applied
and the monitoring systems applied. The dynamics of these
developments is nicely illustrated with the ongoing difficulties at the
Foxconn plants in China, a facility operated by multinational interest
for the purpose of supplying parts and other goods to multinational
enterprises in the production of a host of consumer products for sale
worldwide.212
Most important, though, the crisis and its management suggests the
ways in which institutions may structurally couple in a variety of ways
to preserve a space for regulatory autonomy especially potent in a
polycentric governance framework. The consequence is that though
third-party standard setting and their function of monitoring and
210. See Accreditation, FAIR LAB. Ass'N, http://www.fairlabor.org/accreditation (last
visited Apr. 8, 2013). The Fair Wear Foundation nicely illustrates this relationship:
Companies that produce and distribute products of which the main
manufacturing process is sewing can join FWF and, depending on the
direct influence they have with garment factories, become an FWF
affiliate or FWF ambassador. Both affiliates and ambassadors of FWF
work towards improving the labour conditions in factories and
workshops where the 'cut-make-trim' stage takes place, all over the
world. The basis of the collaboration between FWF and a member is
the Code of Labour Practices. Eight labour standards form the core of
the Code of Labour Practices. Members of FWF must comply with this
Code of Labour Practices.
About, FAIR WEAR FOUNDATION, available at http://www.fairwear.org/22/about/. The FWF Code
of Labour Practices is based on international normative standards, none of which mind states
as a matter of international or domestic law-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the LO Convention. See FWF Code of Labour Practices, at 1, available at http://www.fairwear.
org/ul/cms/fck-uploaded/documents/companies/FWFdocs/fwfcodeoflabour practices.pdf (last
visited Sept. 15, 2013).
211. See generally Larry Cati Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law:
Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 101 (2008).
212. See Larry CatA Backer, Corporate Governance and the Social License to Operate:
Foxconn and the Limits of Legal Formalism in Corporate Governance, LAw AT THE END OF
THE DAY (June 8, 2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/corporate-governance-
and-social-license.html. One of the consumers of Foxconn products is Apple, Inc.
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process certification is potent, the ability of organizations like FIA to
bring other autonomous governance actors within their orbit remain
limited. The relationship between Apple and FLA strengthened their
respective governance autonomy structures but did not cause one to be
absorbed into the other. Even as an FLA accredited company, Apple still
retains control over its supplier governance systems in the areas beyond
labor standards-significantly these include the areas of environmental
standards, ethics, management systems, and worker education rules.
The result is the continued elaboration of hybrid governance systems,
even in the purely private sphere. And make no mistake, Apple has
elaborated a complex and deep system of governance. Its engine is
legislation in the form of contract and practice-the supplier code of
conduct. 213
It is regulatory in function, providing Apple with a substantial
authority not merely to monitor compliance, but also to train and
socialize the members of suppliers. Apple's enforcement is dependent on
its ability to report its activities to its principal
constituents-shareholders and consumers. The conduct standards are
thus directed toward investor and consumer taste and not necessarily
dependent on the needs or desires of the objects of the codes. But they
were also directed inward through the supply chain and downward from
Foxconn to its own suppliers. One of the most interesting aspects of the
communication among Apple and Foxconn was evidenced by the
replication of Apple's vertically arranged governance structures by
Foxconn with respect to its own suppliers. In its 2011 CSR Report,
Foxconn described its own "Supplier SER management" in terms that
mirrored those applicable to it through the Apple Supplier Code of
Conduct.214 This included a zero tolerance policy covering six identified
areas, 215 the requirement that all suppliers enter into environmental
protection contracts with Foxconn, 216 conform their conduct to Foxconn's
213. Apple Supplier code of conduct, page 1 provides:
Apple requires that Suppliers implement this Code using the
management systems described below. Apple may visit (andlor have
external monitors visit) Supplier facilities, with or without notice, to
assess compliance with this Code and to audit Supplier's wage, hour,
payroll, and other worker records and practices. Violations of this Code
may result in immediate termination as an Apple Supplier and in legal
action.
Apple Supplier Code of Conduct, supra note 140, at 1.
214. 2011 CSER Annual Report, FOXCONN, at 42-46, available at http://ser.foxconn.com/
SelectLanguageAction.do?language=1&jump=/cser/AnnualReport.jsp (last visited Sept.
15, 2013).
215. Id. at Section 6.1 (child labor, prison labor, hazardous waste, working conditions,
falsification of information, and employee retaliation).
216. Id. at Section 6.2.
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conflict minerals management policies, 217 and participate in Foxconn's
programs of combatting global warming. 218 While these existed
autonomously of those of Apple (and applied to all of Foxconn's
operations, including those for enterprises other than Apple) throughout
its own global supply chain, it tended to be operated in constant
dialogue with Apple's own system and those of other multinationals
with which Foxconn engaged in business. That both Apple and Foxconn
operated regulatory regimes on Foxconn's workers (at least those
assigned to Foxconn's Apple operations) provides a good illustration of
polycentric governance at the heart of globalization governance. 219 And
it might follow that Foxconn's own CSR regulatory structures might
exhibit characteristics similar to those of Apple, though exhibited
independently of Apple's.
The content of Apple's CSR documentation, coupled with the
responses and criticism it has garnered since its publication, provides a
fruitful means of examining the effectiveness of autonomous,
self-managed CSR practices. Apple compliance materials, primarily the
"Supplier Responsibility Progress Reports," for the years 2006-2012,
were retrieved from the Apple website. 220 It should be no surprise that
publicly available reporting material provided by Apple is primarily
aimed at assuring investors and public critics that the company is doing
everything it can to live up to the aspirations of its broadest policy
statements. Apple presents a patchwork of interconnected, disjointed,
and occasionally out-of-date HTML and PDF documents, making the
task of locating specific information about the company's current
policies in CSR practices a difficult task. For example, each Apple
product's energy efficiency is recorded in a separate PDF file, making
direct comparisons difficult. The layout of the website is divided
217. Id. at Section 6.3. This program was, in turn, coupled with emerging international
standards on conflict minerals management that reflected both developments in public
international law, in the norms produced by public international organizations, and in the
standards developed by the private certification and standard-setting organizations with
which Foxconn engaged. But that engagement did not diminish the coherence of Foxconn's
own self-constituted CSER regulatory framework. The resulting governance universe
evidences its three dimensional spatial qualities. See discussion, infra, Section III.
218. Id. at Section 6.4.
219. This is what Gunther Teubner references as polycentric globalization. See Gunther
Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company Constitutions Beyond
Corporate Governance and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF
CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
JURIDIFICATION (Rainer Nickel, ed., 2009).
220. Apple Supplier Responsibility Progress Report, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/
supplierresponsibility/reports.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (listing all reports from 2007
to 2013). The 2006 Progress Report is no longer available publicly. Reports may be
obtained in the Historical Reports section.
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between environmental concerns in one division and supplier activities
in the other, absent any unified organization. This leads to the presence
of outdated and sometimes conflicting information. For example, the
Environmental FAQs page directs users interested in Apple's Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) compliance on unspecified environmental
indexes to the 2009 Facilities Report.221 An "Environmental Update"
reached from the main environmental reporting page is actually a letter
to consumers from Steve Jobs, dating back to 2008.222 A concerned
member of the public may easily leave the site with old information or
with the belief that the information is unavailable when it may in fact
be hidden in a PDF file that has been cut off from the site architecture
by a long-past update. The chaos of Apple's CSR aesthetics is all the
more jarring given the company's reputation for clean and effective,
easy-to-navigate design.
The messiness of Apple's communication makes sense, however,
when it is understood not as an attempt to comply with externally
developed regulatory norms, but as an attempt by the company to avoid
being tethered to an externally determined set of information practices.
Apple exemplifies the corporate actor for whom transparency has
historically held little appeal, particularly the norm exposure that
would come from third party frameworks. Enjoying a secure market
position and high market power control over its manufacturing supply
chain, disclosure of factory conditions offers little benefit to the company
in the absence of public outcry or criticism. In response to early concerns
about environmental effects, Apple captured a valuable opportunity-its
captive consumer audience and high level of trust allowed self-reporting
to reflect an intrinsically reliable extension of the Apple brand,
effectively annulling its need to enter the market of reporting
standards. For a period, Apple's own statements effectively competed
with others applied to the company by critical media and NGO parties.
These tended to mitigate negative social perceptions while
simultaneously buttressing Apple's legitimacy as a CSR practitioner
among consumers made newly aware of the environmental and labor
costs of its business.223 Apple was able to "double down" on its
preexisting corporate image by presenting its own information, while
221. Apple and the Environment: Frequently Asked Questions, APPLE (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://web.archive.org/web/20110224013423/http://www.apple.comlenvironment/faq.html
(archival copy of the current environmental frequently asked questions page).
222. Apple 2008 Environmental Update, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/environment/re
ports/update.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
223. It is, for example, notable that Apple has been careful to include its supplier
responsibility and environmental reporting in its "Investor News" section. See Investor
News, APPLE, INC., available at http://investor.apple.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
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gaining time to work behind the scenes to discipline and manage the
consequences of unpopular supplier practices. International
corporations are frequently able to maintain effective private CSR
standards for an extended period and can use them to leverage and
enforce changes in industrial practice, effectively competing with
watchdogs and third party monitors to define the scope of legitimate
corporate action, while leveraging them to other market effects. 224
Companies occupying this state of dominance can also dictate the
practices of their suppliers and competitors by altering the scope of
acceptable corporate behavior. 225 At a minimum, companies facing
criticism can use the competing policies of their CSR governance to
blunt and control the scope of public criticism. 226 This is a process that
may continue as Apple gradually shifts to reporting governed by or in
compliance with third party practices.
Thus, in attempting to develop its disclosure practices as criticism
occurred, Apple produced a CSR regime that could not truly satisfy its
critics. This contributed to the crisis of legitimacy and the viability of its
societally constituted governance structures. The way in which Apple
communicated its enforcement of its own regulatory system provides a
window on the nature of the failures leading to crisis. 227 At multiple
places within the design and text in its reporting documents, the
struggle between relying upon the formulae of other CSR entities and
constructing a special, Apple-specific transparency philosophy is
apparent. The authors of Apple's reporting policies and products are
clearly aware of independent standards, and take pains to both
224. Again, Walmart is a pioneering example of this practice in both good and bad
supplier practices. See, e.g., Xiaomin & Ngai, supra note 157, at 63-70.
225. See Larry Cati Backer, On the Autonomous Regulatory Authority of Corporations
in Global Private Markets: Governance Between Corporation and State, LAW AT THE END
OF THE DAY (Mar. 28, 2011, 9:13 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/onthe-
autonomous-regulatory-authority.html.
226. See Larry CatA Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility and Voluntary Codes: Apple, Its
Stakeholders and Its Chinese Laborers, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (June 16, 2006, 5:50 AM),
http://1cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/06/corporate-social-responsibility-and.html.
227. Communication in this case suggests a multi-dimensional loose structural coupling
between institution and stakeholder that combines to create a dynamic environment in which
legitimacy, loyalty, and interactions with the system among its shareholders is of central
concern. "A loosely coupled system is a good vehicle for registering objectives outside of itself,
but is itself an elusive object to understand. Thus, in a loosely coupled system, what is most
likely to be socially constructed is the system itself, not the world it faces." J. Douglas Orton &
Karl E. Weick, Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization, 15(2) THE ACADEMY OF
MANAGEMENT REVIEW 203-23, 218 (1990), available at http://xa.yimg.comlkq/groups/19459303
/1351724291/name/OrtonWeickl990LooselyCoupledSystems.pdf ('Loose coupling, for example,
is the product of many years of effort by organization theorists to combine the contradictory
concepts of connection and autonomy." Id. at 216).
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acknowledge their existence and evade their use. For example, the
clearest mention of GRI compliance, the only listing of indices which
Apple claims to report, is found under the environmental website. 228
This webpage includes links under headings such as "Governance" and
"Supplier Responsibility," but these links lead to other front pages on
the Apple home page without the actual GRI-compliant information.
The 2011 Facilities Report includes the statement that GRI guidelines
"were considered during the preparation of this report," and specific
indices are referenced as "applicable" in footnotes at the end of different
sections.229 In the partitioned area of Apple's public site devoted to
supplier practices, the most heavily promoted transparency document is
the Supplier Code of Conduct, which acts as an overarching statement
of policy, guiding the content of other representations made by the
company regarding its stakeholder impacts.230 The Code of Conduct
emphasizes that it "is modeled on and contains language from" a
number of international and private standards. 231 At the same time,
although there are many commonalities of language, no single
document or set of norms is used as the basis for Apple's policies, a fact
which becomes even more confusing when the annual progress report is
consulted. Each year's report applies similar aspirational language, but
appears to hold the company to a different standard of disclosure. This
issue is partially addressed in the Supplier Responsibility 2012 Progress
Report, in which the detail and number of supplier site audits is greatly
increased. 232 The report represented an implicit concession by Apple
that previous reports were inadequate, while ensuring that the company
would continue to manage the perception that future revelations about
its supplier chain were viewed in a context influenced by Apple's
behavioral ethos.
As with other companies that approach participation with
large-scale transparency efforts in this way, third party entities have
investigated Apple's business practices, in particular employment and
environmental practices at locations along the manufacturer's supply
chain. Representative of these investigative efforts is the report
published in 2007 by the Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale
Ondernemingen (SOMO), a nonprofit organization whose activities are
228. Apple and the Environment: GRI Index, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.comlenviron
ment/reports/gri-index.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
229. See Apple, Inc. 2011 Facilities Report: Environmental Update, APPLE.COM, at 1, available
at https//www.apple.com/environment/reports/docs/AppleFacilities Report_20 1.pdf.
230. Apple Supplier Code of Conduct, supra note 140.
231. Id. at 1, 7-8.
232. Apple Supplier Responsibility 2012 Progress Report, APPLE (Jan. 2012), http://
images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdflAppleSR2012 ProgressReport.pdf.
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funded in part by the Dutch government and which organizes and
interacts with other environmental and labor-oriented corporate
transparency organizations. 233  It "investigates multinational
corporations and the consequences of their activities for people and the
environment around the world."234 By aggregating Apple's CSR policy
statements and other public disclosures, then comparing them with
employee interviews at several supplier factories around the globe,
SOMO attempted to see how well the company was living up to the
aspirational language of its policy claims. 235 As might be expected, a
wide gap existed between Apple's stated policy and its on-the-ground
practices. 236 This and other reports by private and media entities have
publicized the obscurity and potential for abuse latent in Apple's
self-regulated supply system. The environmental NGO "As You Sow"
has been one major source of internal pressure for the corporation,
having introduced multiple shareholder proposals designed to gradually
move the corporation toward greater public disclosure on its
environmental impacts, including proposals for Apple to join more
conventional reporting structures.237 Although Apple has occasionally
acquiesced to limited additional disclosure, it has only recently agreed
to broader cooperation with third party entities. Beyond the stated
purpose of maintaining its privacy and the advantage of a secret supply
system, Apple has clear incentives to avoid structural entanglement;
investment companies have used UNGC standards as a basis for
excluding companies with controversial business practices from their
portfolios.238
But these outside monitors also encounter difficulties and are
themselves sometimes subject to the disciplines of transparency.
Control of data by the data generator, in this case Apple, makes it far
more difficult to verify and contest the information produced. The
transaction costs of data verification can be substantial and the process
233. See Ctr. for Research on Multinational Corps., About SOMO, SOMO, http://somo.
ni/about-somo (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
234. Id.
235. MICHIEL VAN DIJK & IRENE SCHIPPER, APPLE CSR COMPANY PROFILE 4 (2007),
available at http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication 1963.
236. Id. at 44.
237. Climate: Corporate Reporting and Emission Reduction in Computer/IT Sector: Apple,
As You Sow, http://asyousow.org/sustainability/climate%20IT%2Oapple.shtml (last visited Apr.
8, 2013).
238. See, e.g., Desiree Kopppes, Delta Lloyd Excludes 38 Companies for Violating Global
Compact Principles, GLOBAL COMPACT CRITICS (Feb. 2, 2012), http://globalcompactcritics.
blogspot.com/2012/02/delta-1loyd-excludes-38-companies-for.html.
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difficult.239 In a recent and highly publicized example, the "weekly
public radio program 'This American Life' said on Friday that it was
retracting a critical report about Apple's suppliers in China because the
storyteller, Mike Daisey, had embellished details in the narrative."240 A
correspondent for another radio program discovered the errors. 241 This
correspondent tracked down the interpreter Daisey hired who disputed
what Daisey said on his show.242 Apple had been reported as having
attempted unsuccessfully to rebut the allegations for some time
before.243 Ironically this may as well suggest that, like markets for
transparency structures, third party and civil society monitors may also
be disciplined by competitive forces within the constraints of their own
ethics universe. It also suggests the problems of monitoring
transparency in the context of the purpose for which it is
used-reporting, remediation, correction, or participation in decisions
about the continued engagement in certain activity. In this case, the
misrepresentations were actually of events that had occurred, and had
been reported, but not in the context in which they were then used.244
239. See generally Larry Catd Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient
Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1739 (2007) (analyzing the cost of monitoring as an aspect of private legislation through
global supply-chain management contracts).
240. Stelter, supra note 193.
241. Id. From the This American Life Retraction, a description of the magnitude and
scope of the errors:
Some of the falsehoods found in Daisey's monologue are small ones:
the number of factories Daisey visited in China, for instance, and the
number of workers he spoke with. Others are large. In his monologue
he claims to have met a group of workers who were poisoned on an
iPhone assembly line by a chemical called n-hexane. Apple's audits of
its suppliers show that an incident like this occurred in a factory in
China, but the factory wasn't located in Shenzhen, where Daisey
visited.
Press Release, This Am. Life, This American Life Retracts Story: Says It Can't Vouch for
the Truth of Mike Daisey's Monologue about Apple in China (Mar. 16, 2012, 1:00 PM),
available at http://www.chicagopublicmedia.org/sites/default/files/Retraction%2OPress%20
Release%20Final.pdf.
242. Ira Glass, Retracting "Mr. Daisey and the Apple Factory," THIS AM. LIFE (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/blog/2012/03/retracting-mr-daisey-and-the-apple-
factory.
243. Paul Farhi, 'This American Life' Cites 'Fabrications' in Documentary on Apple
Suppliers, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-16/life
style/35450242 1_mike-daisey-gorgeous-devices-factory-accident.
244. The news story about the retraction also noted:
In a report for "Marketplace" on Friday, Mr. Schmitz acknowledged
that other people actually had witnessed harsh conditions at the
factories that supplied Apple. "What makes this a little complicated,"
he said, "is that the things Daisey lied about are things that have
actually happened in China: Workers making Apple products have
been poisoned by hexane. Apple's own audits show the company has
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As a consequence, the reporting might have been misleading, but the
purpose-to deploy information to pressure a reporting entity to
abandon a particular practice or work place rule in favor of others-was
based on something approaching verifiable facts.
Yet, communication with shareholders and consumers, both direct
and indirect, remained essential. In that respect, global media sources
play a critical role. Recall the critical role of the press in reporting the
suicides, Apple's reactions, and the studies by various NGO's and in
facilitating the transmission of witness testimonials to consumers and
investors in Western states that would have provided the impetus
toward Apple's regulatory joint venture with FLA.245 NGOs play a
critical role as authenticators, monitors, and standards stakeholders.
Their participation ensures a certain legitimacy in the system and also
makes it harder for enterprises to use the system solely for self-serving
purposes. Together, these participants have built a system that is
internally consistent and coherent, but is fundamentally fluid and
dynamic. The system draws on, but does not depend on, the action of
states and other international public bodies. Like others systems, it is
imperfect, and subject to manipulation and abuse, but at least to some
appreciable extent, it also appears to work without the direct
intervention of states. The societal constitution of Apple, Inc. is heavily
embedded within networks of regulatory systems developed and
operated by national and international public and private bodies, whose
standards may be invoked by stakeholders with allegiances across
multiple regulatory planes by actors that mediate systemic
communication and enhance the effects of that communication in terms
of facilitating information flows. Apple's interactions with its
stakeholders trigger both legitimacy issues with respect to its ability to
enforce its own regulatory system, and integrity issues as stakeholders
seek to apply multiple standards simultaneously to events that trigger
regulatory response. Something as simple (though horrific and tragic on
a personal level) as employee dissatisfaction marked by extreme
action-suicide-may trigger complex structural coupling among
interpenetrating systems whose actions serve as both evolutive
responses to this stimulus and actions to preserve the integrity of
societally constituted organisms. Apple continues to thrive as an
autonomous regulatory, even as it operates within a number of states
with distinct legal systems and among public and private international
caught underage workers at a handful of its suppliers. These things
are rare, but together, they form an easy-to-understand narrative
about Apple."
Stelter, supra note 140.
245. See generally Backer, supra note 203.
857
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
organizations with applicable regulatory frameworks of their own. The
last section takes up the theoretical implications of this reality.
III. STABLE CONSTITUTIONS IN DYNAMIC OSCILLATION AND COLLISION
COURSE
The story of Apple, Inc.'s regulatory relationships with its
downstream Chinese supply chain illustrates a dynamic element to
societal constitutionalism. The discussion of constitutionalism, of
course, freezes and crops a moment in time and an organization or
organizational type, but organizations exist both in time and among
other organizations-organizations both similar and dissimilar within
the constitutionalizing logic of globalization. Moreover, organizations,
whether states or nonstate actors, exist not merely in time, but also in
constant collision with each other. What in Section I appeared as little
more than the theoretical expansion of the family of self-constituted
actors becomes, in Section II a functionally dynamic polycentric mass
that not just communicates but collides, conflicts, and affects the
external extent of governance spaces and the internal organization of
those spaces. Constitutionalism, then, requires a consideration of
autonomy, form, and function within a crowded field of distinct actors
that must develop a method of both receiving action from outside the
self-constituted society and internalizing this communication
naturalized through the framework of the rules by which a society has
constituted itself.246 It requires a language for that purpose.247 IS it
possible to extract premises of the dynamic element of societal
constitutions?
Hans Lindahl has mapped out a topology of legal orders in a global
setting with constitutionalist implications. 248 That topology posits a set
of interlocking propositions that describe the basic spatial structure of
governance orders. The first proposition is that legal orders create
normative points that permit borders, differentiating and integrating a
246. This, of course, is the essence of the problem facing Apple in its dynamic
confrontation with a crisis of legitimacy and systemic coherence within a polycentric
governance universe. See discussion, Section II.A., supra.
247. Poul F. Kjaer, Transnational Normative Orders: The Constitutionalism of Intra-
and Trans-Normative Law, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 777 (2013) ("[A] broader
category of law, which deals with transfers and adaptation between normative orders as
such, has emerged. This type of law can also be understood as a specific form of trans-
normative law insofar as it is characterized by a relative structural supremacy of cognitive
rather than normative structures of expectations due to its primary orientation towards
the establishment of increased mutual adaptability between normative orders.").
248. See Lindahl, supra note 59.
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governance space into a unity within the space (ought places) 24 9 that is
the point of regulation. The second proposition is that this special unity
creates a border, much like the physical borders of the territorial
frontiers of states.250 The third proposition is that this closing of
frontiers permits ownership of the space enclosed, and thus its control
as against outsiders.251 The fourth proposition is that, so allocated, the
notion of space becomes ambiguous-a space is always both inside and
outside depending on the perspective of the observer. 252 The fifth
proposition is that these ought places themselves may produce strange
places that fall outside a collective's own space.253 The sixth proposition
is that the inside-outside distinction is irreducible to each other, "a
strange place need not be foreign; a foreign place need not be
strange."254 The seventh proposition, that distinctions among spaces are
fundamentally contingent, is made manifest by space and rule (spatial
and legal orders).255 The result, illustrated through the development of
modern cyberlaw, 256 suggests both the emergence of polycentric orders
and their intermeshing along multi-spatial and legal ordering lines.
Lindahl's analysis adds a third dimension to the conventional
two-dimensional conceptualization of governance space in the wake of
globalization. 25 7 Poul Kjaer speaks of a "common feature of public and
private organizations operating in the transnational space is that
they-despite numerous predictions of the opposite-internally tend to
have a vertical nucleus in the form of a hierarchical organizational
structure of the sort originally described by Weber."258 As a
consequence, it is common to understand a crowded two-dimensional
space-organized by territory-within which a host of functionally
differentiated self-reflexive and constituted governance units can
operate simultaneously.
249. "Ought places" are understood as "places where behavior ought or ought not to take
place-that lends a spatial form to the common interest of a community." Hans Lindahl,
A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
AND EXCLUSION 117, 123 (Ronald Tinnevelt & Helder De Schutter, eds., 2010).
250. See Lindahl, supra note 59.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 722.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See generally Poul F. Kjaer, The Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A
Continental European Perspective on Governance, Law, and the Political in the Transnational
Space, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 489.
258. Id. at 505.
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The consequence is that a multitude of different forms of
normative orders can be observed in the transnational
space. A highly complex disorder of normative order
exists in the sense that a whole range of structures
producing their own forms of normativity operates and
collides like billiard balls in the transnational space.
Especially small and mid-sized states are therefore
reduced to one set of actors among many.25 9
But Lindahl suggests another layer to societally constituted
governance units. He suggests instead, not merely fracture, 260 but
porosity. Functional differentiation in the constitution of systems
produces governance units that are not fortresses with impermeable
borders that can be physically felt. Rather, space is understood as
divided two-dimensionally (horizontally and vertically)-the way
fracture and the functional differentiation within a territory is
understood-and also spatially-self-constituted systems may reach the
same set of actors (objects and subjects of regulation) simultaneously,
the way polycentricity is understood. 261 But spatiality is also understood
in changes to the quality of the border and hence the constitutional
character of permeability. 262 The resulting dynamic, triggered by the
activities of these subjects and objects or regulation, produces a dynamic
element to the constitution of systems that itself then reaches back into
each closed system, producing a constitutional effect through a cycle of
action and response that touches on the constitutional boundaries of a
governance system. 263
259. Id. at 507.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. This was nicely suggested in Saskia Sassen, Bordering Capabilities Versus Borders:
Implications for National Borders, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 567, 569 (2009) ("The new
specialized borderings that I describe are the borders of our current age: they cut across
traditional borders but do not necessarily reduce the incidence of borders, even though
they change the character and logics of bordering."). It is also suggested in Gunther
Teubner's work on the modalities of contract. Gunther Teubner, In the Blind Spot: The
Hybridization of Contracting, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 51, 55-56 (2007) ("Our first
interim finding is that social differentiation splits the formerly unitary contract into three
autonomous concatenations of events in the respective legal, economic, and production
contexts. This difference is-despite (or even because of) mutual observation, structural
coupling, re-entry, and co-evolution-always reproduced anew as an insurmountable
hermeneutic dissonance.").
263. It is in this sense, perhaps that one can understand how, for example, nonstate
actors may act as steering subjects in international economic law while being steered. See,
e.g., Karsten Nowrot, Transnational Corporations as Steering Subjects in International
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While Lindah1 suggests the richness of polycentric and
intermeshing governance orders, Gunther Teubner has suggested the
fecundity of governance forms out of crisis, catastrophe, and societal
collision.264 I have been suggesting the power of normative systems,
including those that produce the substantive values of self-constituting
communities, as essential to the construction of a complex and
networked system of poly-governance if human rights impacts
individual or institutional actions. Those normative values, of course,
are grounded in ideology, a necessity that I explored elsewhere. 265 But
Teubner would go farther, suggesting in effect, that the addictive effects
of ideology might well shape the nature of the behavior within and
between systems. He has explored the possibility that systems, like
individuals, can be organized as inherently addictive or at least prone to
addictive behavior under certain conditions of stress. 266
One could use these hypotheses as the foundation for an exploration
of the character of compulsion, but Teubner has something else,
something more interesting, in mind. He means to use the insights of
systemic addiction to posit the way social systems approach catastrophe
and transform themselves at the moment of disaster, not through the
intervention of political actors, but autonomously and within the bounds
of its own systemic logic. 267 Not that this cyclical set of dialectical
"moments" occur in isolation; rather, systemic addiction-as it reaches
to and through the moment of confrontation with its own contradiction
and reconstitutes itself to avoid obliteration-engages in these activities
in constant communication with the economic and legal spheres. 268 That
inevitable systemic lurching toward catastrophe and its revaluing
effects on the system itself, then, are communicated with and through
the law and economic systems through which it interacts with business
and the law-state. 269
Economic Law: Two Competing Visions of the Future?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 803
(2011).
264. See Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of 'Hitting the Bottom',
in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF
FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 3, 3 (Poul F. Kjaer et al. eds., 2011)
265. See Backer, supra note 36.
266. See Teubner, supra note 267, at 3 ("Is there such a thing as collective addiction?").
See also id. at 3-4 (explaining that self-destructive growth compulsion caused
institutionalized systems, rationally organized, to act against their own interests).
267. Here, perhaps, is an ironic application of the parable found in Luke 4:23 ('Iarpt,
EpdTEUov CEXUT6v . . . . ["Physician, heal thyself. . . ."]), recast as-System, heal thyself.
268. This, of course, was the essence of the communication of Apple, Inc. as it moved
from isolated to more intermeshed systemic operation. See discussion, Section II.A., supra.
269. Yet, Nietzsche looms in the shadows. He reminds us that such communication can
be inherently subordinating-another contradiction that itself is such to the cyclicity of
dialectical system built on contradiction. In his exploration of the parameters of
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The addictive behavior of social systems embodies the contradiction
built into the system itself. Catastrophe represents that moment when
the self-organizing constitution of the social system is confronted in an
unavoidable way with its destruction through the application of the
logic of its own constitution. 270 Catastrophe, in essence, provides a
constitutional moment when the networked connection of communities
of self-constituted organs exposes its connection in systems of capillary
constitutionalism that transcend legal and economic codes and the
borders of functionally differentiated governance organizations. 271
Teubner starts with a search for the character of
self-destructiveness in social systems-the root of its internal
contradiction and the lubricant for its revaluation in the face of
catastrophe. 272  He criticizes the compartmentalized-and
bureaucratic-approaches to a "solution" to the financial "based upon
factor analysis, in which individual causes are isolated, through the
attribution of causality, and held responsible for the crisis."273 He
suggests a deeper analysis. Systemic addiction is understood within the
context of social processes-as a phenomenology of communication. 274
Teubner suggests communicative addiction as a compulsion to growth
communicated through the mechanics of social interaction grounded in
the dynamics of the production of money.275 This "raises a fundamental
punishment in the original connection of moral concept of guilt (Schuld) in the material
concept of debt (Schulden), Nietzsche points to a variation of the notions of communication
and hierarchy, as well as the contradiction and reconstitution of ideal and action. Guilt
and Debt are built on principles of equivalence and transformation, that is, on tha
transposability of action, effect, and commodity. "And whence did ... this idea of an
equivalence between injury and pain? I have already divulged it: in the contractual
relationship between creditor and debtor, which is as old as the idea of 'legal subjects' and
in turn points back to the fundamental forms of buying, selling, barter, trade, and traffic."
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, "Good and Evil," "Good and Bad", in ON THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS AND ECCE HOMO 24, 63 (Walter Kaufmann, ed. & trans., R. J. Hollingdale trans.,
Vintage Books 1969) (1887).
270. See Teubner, supra note 219, at 4. This was the essence of the catastrophe facing
Apple when caught in the contradictions of its own internally ordered system which defied
efforts either to enforce or to explain to intermeshed stakeholder and autonomously
operating systems. See discussion, Section II.A., supra.
271. See Teubner, supra note 219, at 4. But this is neither Hegelian dialectics nor Marxist
dialectical materialism, though both also reflect the cyclidity of systemic transformations
lubricated by the contradictions built into social systems.
272. Id. at 5-10.
273. Id. at 5. I have suggested the same in the context of European efforts to assert
regulatory power over irregular securities markets. See Larry CatA Backer, Monitor and
Manage: MiFID and Power in the Regulation of EU Financial Markets, 27 Y.B. EUR. L.
349 (2008).
274. See Teubner, supra note 219, at 6.
275. See id. at 8.
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question for autopoietics: [h]ow are we to conceive of the relationship
between social self-reproduction and the compulsion to
growth?"276-what I call the instinct toward managerialism. 277
A dynamic environment of self-reproduction of social systems must
include both the equilibrium and destabilizing elements. Systems that
do not embrace the logic of their own inversion, as compulsion, become
irrelevant.278 Teubner recognizes that there is "an inherent compulsion
to ever higher production in function systems other than the
economy-an inherent compulsion which, on the one hand, is a
necessary condition of self-reproduction, but which, on the other, can be
propelled by assignable growth-inducing mechanisms to the point of
transition into destructive tendencies."279 He notes that law systems are
capable of creating conflict through their own regulation-that is that
the law itself contains its own contradictions. 280 Politics systems exhibit
the same fundamental contradictory state; the movement toward the
attainment of the fundamental objectives of such systems creates the
conflicts that also distort the objectives and makes their attainment
more difficult. To understand the distinction between normal
growth-growth that does not threaten the stability of systems and
their networks-from metastasizing growth that threatens stability,
276. Id. at 9.
277. Yet, this suggests the possibility of a managerialism that is at variance with the
foundational dynamic of the dialectic that Teubner identifies. That managerialism is
considered in the consideration of self-destructive growth versus growth dynamics in
communication. Id. at 7-10. Addictive behavior has a negative connotation, like the
addictive imperatives of globalized capital considered earlier. These behaviors are
destabilizing to individual and to system. They are also inherent in the body of the
individual or system. The nature of addiction, after all, is its compulsiveness.
The definition of individual addiction-compulsive engagement in an
activity despite lasting negative consequences-must be re-thought for
social systems in general, and for collective actors in particular. Which
'addiction mechanisms' are responsible for the fact that the autopoietic
self-reproduction of a social system through the recursivity of
system-specific operations reverts into a communicative compulsion to
repetition and growth, bringing self-destructive consequences in its
wake?
Id. at 8. Yet this addiction, if Teubner is right, is also natural to the individual and
system-without it, as Nietzsche reminds us, the dynamic element dissipates-no growth,
no progress, no catastrophe bringing revaluation and transformation of the inner
constitutions of systems.
278. This was certainly a lesson applied by Apple as it opened its governance framework
to outside intermeshing and by that opening preserved its own integrity. See discussion,
Section II.B., supra.
279. Teubner, supra note 219, at 10.
280. Id. at 11.
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Teubner turns to catastrophe-destabilization powerful enough to
threaten systems. 281
For that purpose, the analogy to cancer provides a powerful
metaphor, and he invokes the idea of constitutional moments. 282
Teubner suggests a hybrid constitutionalization, in which a balance is
reached between internal processes and external interventions in the
process of reconstitution in the face of catastrophe. That is, a wall of
external communication may be necessary to produce the boundaries
within which self-reflectivity may serve to reconstitute systems in the
midst of dynamic revaluation. 283 Teubner suggests "not only state
instruments of power, but also legal rules, and 'civil society'
countervailing powers from other contexts, media, public discussion,
spontaneous protest, intellectuals, social movements, NGOs or trade
union power . . . should apply such massive pressure on the function
systems that internal self-limitations are configured and become truly
effective."284 Thus, the task is to enlist the web of systems in their
communicative interactions to foster interactions that provide a space
within which any particular subsystem can construct its own stabilizing
set of limits. The object is managerial and can be significant.
"Political-legal regulation and external social influence are only likely to
succeed if they are transformed into a self-domestication of the systemic
growth dynamic. This requires massive external interventions from
politics, law, and civil society: specifically, interventions of the type
suited to translation into self-steering."285
The difficulty, though, when dealing with social systems-for
example the global economy-is that the character of the normative
structure is complex. With a nod to both Derrida 286 and Foucault, 287
Teubner focuses on the capillary constitution-the microstructures of
rules that constitute behavior values. This capillary constitution may
281. Id.
282. Id. at 10-21.
283. Id. This was nicely evidenced, of course, by the permeable barriers between Apple,
Foxconn, and the outside certification organizations. See discussion, supra, Section II.
284. Id. at 13.
285. Id. at 15. Yet, as the Apple episode suggests, it can as well, in three-dimensional
governance space also consist of massive interventions from other societally constituted
organizations operating in nonstate governance space. See discussion, Section II.B., supra.
286. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, THE OTHER HEADING: REFLECTIONS ON TODAY'S
EUROPE (Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael B. Naas trans., 1992) (1991) (describing how the
European identity is changing through immigration and how that identity will have to
adapt).
287. Michel Foucault, Rdderwerke des Uberwachens und Strafens: Ei Gesprach mit
J.-J. Brochier [The Wheels of Monitoring and Penalties: A Discussion with J.-J. Brochier],
in MIKROPHYSIK DER MACHT [THE MICROPHYSICS OF POWER] 31, 45 (Michel Foucault ed.,
1976).
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not be managed directly-the tools of intervention are too crude for that
purpose, but intervention may serve the same purpose as a grain of
sand in an oyster-as an irritant that energizes the self-constituting
mechanics of the subsystem in accordance with its own logic. 288
But this raises issues of method. For Teubner, this is the case of the
Beelzebub casting out the devil.289 The pattern of political
constitutionalism might provide a loose template for managing societal
capillary constitutionalism-that is for stabilizing systems grounded in
the constitution of micro power. And what better notion than
Rechtsstaat notion for that purpose-process as the bones of system
constitution!
Just as in political constitutions power is used to limit
power, so the system-specific medium must turn against
itself. Fight fire by fire; fight power by power; fight law
by law; fight money by money. Such a medial
self-limitation would be the real criterion differentiating
the transformation of the 'inner constitution' of the
economy from external political regulation. 290
This social system stability is not sourced within the state, but in
three "'reflection centers' within society, and in particular, within
economic institutions, into the criterion of a democratic society.
Candidates for a capillary constitutionalisation exist not only in the
organised sector of the global economy, in corporations and banks, but
also in its spontaneous spheres." 291 These collegial institutions
"cultivate the relevant logic of actions, and [have required] them to be
constitutionally institutionalised."292 Here, one melds the utility of the
288. "The desired course for social sub-constitutions is, as has been said, in the limitations of
the endogenous tendencies towards self-destruction and environmental damage. This is the
core of the constitutional probldmatique, this difficult handling of the focal sub-system's
self-transformation and that of their environmental systems." Teubner, supra note 219, at 15.
289. Id. at 16.
290. Id. at 17.
291. Id. (citations omitted).
292. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). This notion of collegial institutions as collective
stakeholders in societal constitutionalism, even in the economic sphere, has found
expression within the governance efforts of public institutions in the wake of the 2007
financial crisis. The Financial Stability Board system represents a public sector version of
this naturalization of institutionalized communication within the economic sphere. See
Larry CatA Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance
Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 784-91 (2011).
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topology of Hans Lindahl's "ought places" with Teubner's process of
engagement for crisis and change.
Key for Teubner are "[t]he politicisation of consumers," "[t]he
ecologisation of corporate governance," and "[p]lain money." 293 The first
concept evolves subsystem process to the construction and exercise of
social preferences; the second concept broadens the impact of corporate
constituencies within the governance structures and decision-making of
economic entities; the third concept would add stability and order to the
global financial constitution. 294 The latter would require the reassertion
of national power over the power to create money and money
equivalents-the medium of economic exchange in its most liquid form.
Legal norms serve as both bridge and glue, joining autonomous
systems.
A constitution is always the connection of two real
ongoing processes. From the point of view of law, it is
the production of legal norms, which is typically merged
with the basic structures of the social systems. From the
point of view of the social system, it is the generation of
basic structures of the social order, which
simultaneously inform the law and are regulated by
it.295
But law serves a more important purpose: it becomes the source for
closure, for the provision of a mechanics of stability. The stability
provided by law is one that a social system, for example, the global
economic system, may be incapable of providing under the logic of its
own normative ordering. Law in this sense is both an ordering
mechanism and an intervention to avoid the catastrophe of the
self-destructive addictive tendencies of any system. 296
293. Teubner, supra note 219, at 17-19.
294. See id. Indeed, consumer and investor activism, expressed in buying and
investment decisions, were central to Apple's actions, to the relationship between Apple
and FLA, and ultimately between Foxconn and its employees. The irony is that labor, a
direct stakeholder, could exercise a political role and precipitate a governance crisis within
the Apple-Foxconn-China space only by their suicides. The more remote stakeholder
tended to have greater political effect. See discussion, Section II, supra. Cf. Larry CatA
Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the
Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INTERNAVL L. 591-653 (2008).
295. Id. at 28.
296. See id. at 29. And yet, as Section II suggested, in three-dimensional space, law's
role may be played not by governance substitutes, but by monitoring and certification. Cf.
Larry CatA Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the Governance Effects
of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101-48 (2008).
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That is the key to societal constitutionalism's addiction problem.
Law as methadone-i[tihe economy ... requires massive interventions
from law in order to achieve self-constitutionalisation; albeit not to the
comprehensive extent characteristic of politics." 297 There is a formalist
cast to this constitution of societal systems undergirded by law. And not
just governance, but connected by a more formal rule structure typical
of the Rechtsstaat. "Through the restriction of money-creating
competences, law apprehends the limitative function of an economic
constitution and, at the same time, stabilises the self-reflexive relations
of the payment operations, which, without being legally anchored in this
way, would again disperse."298 I wonder, though, whether law, as
Teubner understands it, is broad enough to include those techniques of
behavior controlling power that serve Foucault's notions of
governmentality. 299
297. Teubner, supra note 219, at 29.
298. Id. at 31.
299. See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 102-03 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991)
(describing governmentality as "[tlhe ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures,
analyses and reflections . . . [t]he tendency which, over a long period and throughout the
West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms . . . of this type of
power . . . [and] [t]he process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state
of justice of the Middle Ages . . . gradually becomes 'governmentalized."'). For a valuable
analysis, see Wendy Larner & William Walters, Global Governmentality: Governing
International Spaces, in GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY: GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL SPACES
1, 16 (Wendy Larner & William Walters eds., 2004) ("What we have called global
governmentality entails a move of 'bracketing' the world of underlying forces and causes,
and instead examining the different ways in which the real has been inscribed in
thought."); Michael Reed, From the 'Cage' to the 'Gaze? The Dynamics of Organizational
Control in Late Modernity, in REGULATION AND ORGANIZATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 17, 43 (Glenn Morgan & Lars Engwall eds., 1999) ("[Blureaucratic control
is giving way to a qualitatively different regime of control based on a contrasting
trajectory and logic of regulative ordering in which intensive, but remote and dispersed,
scanning of organizational behaviour and its 'normalizing' effects are the key features.").
Consider the complex of power issues involved in the construction of
transnational transparency regimes of financial markets. Entities like
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank "have found
themselves drawn into battles with a range of transnational,
multinational, domestic, and international authorities over the
production of financial information and the diffusion of financial
information." In this aspect, surveillance is felt as gouvernmentalit, a
linking of governance with the techniques of its power.
Larry Cata Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance Effects
of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 136-37 (2008) (citations
omitted) (quoting Margaret Hanson, The Global Promotion of Transparency in Emerging
Markets, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 63, 64 (2003) ("These political battles cast a critical light
on seemingly apolitical assumptions that motivate much of the theoretical rationale for
international governance strategies inspired by the goal of a transparent global financial
system.")).
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But the notion of governmentality might require avoidance for
another reason-it detracts from the larger project of securing
recognition of the possibility of constitutionalism beyond the state.
Teubner recognizes the skepticism within the academic herd,300 but he
seeks to assuage them through mimicry, and thus the transposition of
law and social system as basis of autonomous constitution (and
emergence of autonomous constitutional code).30' In any case, it is not
clear to me that the dynamics of the law-state ought to transpose to the
social state. Here, Teubner's own resort to Foucault, and especially to
notions of governmentality, might provide a useful insight. The
construction of a constitutional code, understood in a systems way,
might be understood as grounded in structural coupling of social system
and governance code, built into the multiple fabrics of behavior
managing systems, not law understood in its traditional form using the
metrics of traditional constitutionalism. Understood in that way, the
constitution of a global economy, founded on the communication among
law- governance-politics systems and the establishment of governance
rule hierarchy (constitutional code above the governance code from
which it is derived and through which its elaboration is limited),
becomes clearer and more powerful.
The communicative (structural coupling) aspect then comes to the
foreground, tying into Teubner's notion of communication between
systems as an irritant (and thus as a spur to internal change) and as an
external limit on internal operation.302
These two types of programmes irritate one another to
the point where they cause a specific co-evolutionary
path of legal and economic structures within the
economic constitution. . . . Fundamental principles of the
economic system are re-constructed as legal
constitutional principles (according to the particular
historical situation: property, contract, competition,
social market economy or ecological sustainability)....
In the opposite direction, something comparable occurs:
the meta-code allows the re-entry of law into the
economic system (again, historically variable: mandatory
rules of contract law, the social obligations of property,
the limits of competition, rule of law principles in
economic decisions or fundamental rights within
300. I use the term here in its Nietzschean sense, though note an irony in applying
Teubner's notion of self destructive compulsion to the herd habit.
301. Teubner, supra note 219, at 31-32.
302. Id. at 32-33.
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corporations). Thereby, constitutional law binds
economic operations. 303
We now understand the role of law sub-systems within the process
of constitutional management as part of Teubner's construct, but what
about political subsystems; what about the role of the state? "In the
functionally-differentiated society, the political constitution cannot
fulfill the role of defining the fundamental principles of other
subsystems without causing a problematic de-differentiation-as
occurred in practice in the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth
century."304 In place of hierarchy, Teubner offers communication as an
action-inducing irritant and as autonomy. "We must give up the notion
that, in the state, politics represents society and other social
spheres-people or sub-spheres-participate therein. No social
sub-system, not even politics, can represent the whole society."305
But the economic system cannot play its role properly unless it too
acquires it own autonomous politics. Here again is mimicry. A social
system, like a law or political system requires its demos. And the
actions of that demos constitutes legitimating acts and the preservation
of autonomy within a system that preserves accountability.306 Again,
structural mechanics are meant to manage the contradictions of
systems that are inherently self destructive, as system, by providing
webs and networks of restraint.307 But like political systems, that
management of contradiction requires an outside force-systemic
coupling and intermeshing produces the therapeutic results like that of
303. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
304. Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
305. Id. at 37.
306. This is the essence of the political concept of popular sovereignty in Western public
law constitutionalism and political theory. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE
PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988). It also
underlies the fundamental principle of the "mass line" in Marxist Leninist states like
China. See Larry Cati Backer & Keren Wang, State and Party in the Scientific
Development of a Legitimate Rule of Law Constitutional System in China: The Example of
Laojiao and Shuanggui (June 1, 2013), Conference: Rule of Law with Chinese
Characteristics, Vol. 2013, at 101, Penn State Law Research Paper No. 26-2013, available
at http://ssrn.comlabstract=2273044. That it can be transposed to societally constituted
systems, like enterprises, merely reflects the parallels the similarity in constitution and
organization, a central premise of this article.
307. See id. at 40-41. Of course, this was the essence of the position that Apple found
itself in 2012, one that both produced the crisis (fear of a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of
consumers, investors, and states) and its solution (by embedding their system within and
among those of certifier organizations) which then strengthened the autonomy and
coherence of Apple's societally-constituted organization as reflected in and through its
structurally coupled governance universe. See discussion Section II.B, supra.
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the psychologist with the power to restrain and a set of therapeutic
devices that the patient may use to self correct the contradictions of self-
destructive compulsion. 308 For the financial system, that role would be
served by an instrument of the law-state-the central banks.
"'Guardians of the constitution'-this is the appropriate metaphor. And
just as constitutional assemblies and constitutional courts are the
guardians of the political constitution, so the central banks and the
constitutional courts are the guardians of the economic constitution.
And their constitutional politics requires a high degree of autonomy."30 9
However, effectiveness is possible only to the extent that these central
banks attain a degree of autonomy from any one sector of the
law-politics-economics troika.
Here, the meaning of an autonomous financial
constitution is revealed, which must control its own logic
and cannot, despite its highly political character, be
delivered by institutionalised politics. The analogy with
constitutional courts is, again, appropriate. This is a
principle not of the political, but of the societal
separation of powers. 310
Thus, Teubner draws this complex web together. All systems are
subject to catastrophe as a function of the inherent contradictions of its
own internal logic. Those contradictions are manifested (using the
language of the therapeutic) in compulsive and self-destructive behavior
which, given the internal logic of any system, can lead to
catastrophe-the imperiling of system order itself.311  The
self-destructive contradictions of all sub-systems (but, in this case, the
economic social system) derived from the compulsions of its own
internal logic can be managed. That management is inherent in the
operation of the complex web of the troika law-politics-economics
subsystems within which collective organs operate. 312 Yet, no networked
system can successfully project its power completely or thoroughly to
reconstitute another. It may provide boundaries against the external
effects of internal compulsion, and it may, acting within the constraints
308. This is the essence of the third party certification process-one of adoption of
standards, internalization within an autonomous constituted system, and monitoring and
assessment within the constraints of the standards developed to prop up systemic
coherence. See discussion supra, Section II.B.
309. Teubner, supra note 219, at 40-41.
310. Id. at 41 (emphasis removed).
311. Id.
312. Id.
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of its own logic, irritate internal reaction in other systems. 313 But these
irritants can be consciously applied and targeted. And thus, a simple
irritant-the severe limitation on the power over money-is suggested
as a means of working the machinery of networked sub-systems
communicating with (irritating) each other and thus forcing internal
confrontations with the illogic of internal constitutions before
catastrophe manifests to threaten all sub-systems within the greater
global social organ. 314
Teubner has elaborated the possibility of order in the systems
cosmos. He identifies the levers through which the system itself can face
its self-destructive contradictions and compulsive addictions, while still
avoiding excess and, at the same time, producing conditions that permit
foundational revaluation in the face of the possibility of catastrophe. 315 I
wonder, though, whether fundamental systems order necessarily
includes a large dose of chaos. It is not clear to me that the fundamental
contradictions of systems-their relentless drive toward the limits of
their logic; their compulsion to drive toward their limit, and, by such
compulsion, to destroy their essence as they strive to attain it-is not
both basic and inescapable. 316
It is not the nearness of catastrophe, but catastrophe itself that
provides the space within which a system either reengages in
self-revaluation or is overtaken and reconstituted from outside. That is
a possible lesson from the Great Depression of 1929. Teubner draws
near that precipice and pulls back. But in that turn, he has illuminated
313. Id.
314. See id.
315. Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of 'Hitting the Bottom,' in
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL
DIFFERENTIATION 3, 15-16 (Poul Kjaer, Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 2011).
316. I wonder whether catastrophe is avoidable in the face of the inherent
contradictions of systems, and the fundamental drive of systems to follow their internal
logic (purity) to its limit (compulsion, addiction, crisis).
People, groups, all conscious organisms simultaneously seek the
protection of oblivion, an acceptance of repose in some perfect and
eternal state, equilibrium, on the one hand, and also struggle to
overcome the desire for oblivion, that is struggle against faith. Such
struggle leads to emancipation for those who can successfully struggle.
That success is valid for those who struggle, but cannot be gifted to
others. Each in turn must struggle-individual, group,
organism-against the reality bequeathed to it. And thus the process
of self-overcoming and recurrence are linked through death and
transformation.
Larry Catd Backer, Cycles of Legal Foundations: Law After Deconstruction, LAW AT THE
END OF THE DAY (Aug. 14, 2006, 1:44 PM), http://cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/08/cycles-
of-legal-foundations-law-after.html. This suggests an ancient insight into the cyclicity
inherent in systems. See generally IBN KHALD.N, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION
To HISTORY (Franz Rosenthal trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1377).
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an elegant and plausible basis for management, far more coherently
drawn than the limited scope approaches that have been the bread and
butter of financial sector analysis since the recognition of the slide
toward financial sector catastrophe in 2007. It is in this sense that Ino
Augsberg's insight about the role of interpretation of systemic text-as a
form of structural coupling-can be usefully understood:
Law's function is then no longer primarily to guarantee
unity, but rather to guarantee difference. Luhmann's
theory of fundamental rights can serve as an example of
this kind of legal theory. Under circumstances in which
society has 'dynamized its restabilization process, so
that change has become a constant,' the specifically legal
activity, understood as a social immune system, has to
reprogram its immune reactions so that they focus more
on protecting diversity and variation.317
It is also in this context that Marc Amstutz's 31s insights about the
way in which legal systems adapt to their social environments can, in
turn, be adapted to the governance system of nonstate actors. 19
"Self-organizing values deriving from legal policy, on the one hand,
social responsiveness through the plasticity of the normative elements
woven into a legal system, on the other-these, in a nutshell, are the
conditions for evolvable, time-binding law."320 This produces both a
move toward constitutionalization as a self-referencing structure
(preserving stability)3 21 and a privileging of norm certainty in text.322
These insights must be adapted precisely because they remain two-
dimensional. That two dimensionality is grounded in the embrace of the
law-state system and the hierarchy of law as the prism through which
317. Augsberg, supra note 75, at 386-87 (citations omitted).
318. Marc Amstutz, Biography, HIIL, LAw OF THE FUTURE FORUM, http://www.lawofthe
future.org/167/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2013) ("Marc Amstutz is Professor of Commercial
Law, Legal Theory and Sociology of Law at the University of Freiburg. He is a member of
the executive board of the German Association for Law & Society (Vereinigung fdr Recht
und Gesellschaf) and co-founder of the Institut fir Recht und Wirtschaft (IDE) at the
University of Freiburg where he is executive director.")
319. Marc Amstutz, Global (Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary Jurisprudence, 9
GERMAN L.J. 465 (2008).
320. Id. at 474 (2008) (citation omitted).
321. "These rules on rules must not only be capable of reacting to unforeseen cases, that
is, to provide guidance as to how new law is to be created; the rules on rules must also
assure the finitude of the adjudication process." Id. at 475 (citation omitted).
322. "Only textuality can ensure that a rule is responsive for social evolution." Id.
(citation omitted).
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systemic relationships are understood. 323 With a focus on the
relationship of the autonomy of law and society, the nature of regulatory
relationships posit a singular layer-that between society as a singular
amalgam and law, bounded up in states.324 That is a useful framework
for understanding the relationship between these organisms around
which political society was organized through the end of the 20th century
through structural coupling grounded in the semiotics of communication
among a single set of core actors and a single set of signs. 325 But it does
little to suggest the ways in which this relationship is itself embedded,
and increasingly so within a world structured on the free movement
principles of globalization, among governance systems and the multiple
social organisms through which they are expressed, including the state
and society, but also international public organizations, civil society,
religion, and economic enterprises. It also does little to indicate the
ways in which the technologies of regulation have themselves changed
the architecture of regulatory systems. 326
What emerges from the application of these insights drawn from
theory to the reality suggested by Apple, Inc., is the antithesis of
orderliness, unity, and linearity of conventional constitutionalism.
Societal constitutionalism is marked by four fundamental
characteristics that also define the constitutional element of the
structure of global law of which societal constitutionalism forms a
part. 327  These four-fracture, fluidity, permeability, and
polycentricity328-both structure the dynamic governance space to which
even states are now bound, and also forms the essence of the premises
323. See, e.g., Marc Amstutz, The Letter of the Law, 10 GERMAN L.J. 357 (2009).
324. "One spectacular example of text fluctuations is the 6criture of the BGB, which was
applicable law in an empire, throughout the Weimarer parliamentarianism, in the fascist
regime of the Third Reich, in the Bonn Republic, and finally also in reunited Germany."
Id. at 373.
325. Id. ("the boundaries of the semantic identity of signs are functions of an open
system of permanent re-differentiation . . . which makes it possible to change meanings
when signs are repeated, and . . . the possibility for society to give Law constant measure
and to determine the modulating legal language game.")
326. See Vaios Karavas, The Force of Code: Law's Transformation Under
Information-Technological Conditions, 10 GERMAN L.J. 463, 478-80 (2009). The discussion
of calculable normativity first considered in Vaios Karavas & Gunther Teubner,
http://www.Company NameSucks.com: The Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights
Against "Private Parties" within Autonomous Internet Law, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1335, 1347
(2003) suggests both the transformation and limited context within which traditional
structural coupling tethered to the law-state system is understood and studied.
327. Backer, supra note 44 (arguing that four characteristics create "the fundamental
structure of global law . .. [and] serve as the structural foundations of its constitutional
element, its substantive element, and its process element").
328. Id.
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that guide the self-constituting behaviors of nonstate actors like Apple,
Inc. Fracture is certainly well understood within now classic societal
constitutionalism.329 Fracture suggests a reordering rather than an end
of order and the emergence of multiple, uneven, and functionally
distinct governance communities that slide over, through, and within a
set of unchanging objects and subjects of governance-consumers,
investors, citizens, and "those norms that structure and organize
fracture in a world order populated by an aggregate of a large variety of
governance organs with territorial boundaries that vary with the
variation in the character of the governance organization."330 Apple, Inc.
is operated in a governance space marked by fracture-between the
laws of home and host states, between international law and norms,
among its own operating governance rules and those of its downstream
supplier, and near the rules of third party private accrediting units from
which it buys legitimacy among public and private constituencies. 331
Beyond fracture there is fluidity, "based on the assumption that
governance organizations are impermanent and that there is no need to
organize a meta-system around the premise that once established,
self-constituted organizations ought to be preserved."332 Fluidity
suggests the opposite of governance equilibrium and stability. It posits
that governance systems move with the borders and tastes of the
constituting agents.333 It suggests temporality as a significant factor in
self-reflexivity. Governance units do not exist outside of history, nor do
they exist outside the logic of the ideology of mass movements that now
serve to frame governance. Fluidity suggests the permanence of the
norms within which governance is effectuated but not the functionally
differentiated organs the objective of which is to increase the welfare of
their participants within those norms. 334 Fluidity was central to Apple's
governance environment-with a changing architecture of governance
grounded in a more stable system of norms tied to the desires of critical
stakeholders, consumers, and investors, and subject to the incomplete
interventions of states.
Fluidity suggests the porosity that is a characteristic of systems
operating in a fractured governance space. This is the realm of
329. See, e.g., Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 16, at 1017-44 (identifying "[t]hree
guiding principles for the decentralized networking of legal regimes").
330. Backer, supra note 44, at 187.
331. See discussion at Section II, supra.
332. Backer, supra note 44, at 188.
333. Id.
334. This suggests the medieval distinctions between gubernaculum and jurisdictio, the
administration of the apparatus of government and the overarching normative framework
within which those operate. Cf. Larry CatA Backer, Reifying Law-Government, Law and
the Rule of Law in Governance Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 521, 522 (2008).
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structural coupling, but not of communication in its two-dimensional
context-permeability suggests a porosity of systems in paradox. 335 The
more open the system is to inter-systemic penetration, the more stable
and structurally sound the system. Societal constitutionalism
reconceives borders as divisions that separate but do not impede. Apple,
Inc. was at the center of a set of systems that projected themselves in
and through each other, and yet, by that projection, each system
preserved and solidified its integrity even as it opened itself to reaction
from the penetration. Apple's relationship with national law (United
States and China), international norms, the norms of the Fair Labor
Association, all contributed to or affected the regulatory relationships
between Apple and its suppliers and became critical in the construction
and maintenance of Apple's autonomous governance structures for
supplier behavior. Apple maintained the structural autonomy of its own
supplier governance even as that governance was substantially affected
by interventions from other governance units. The techniques of
structural coupling-and its dynamics-are at the center of Teubner's
notions of irritants and cyclicity, but the intervention cycles now operate
in a deeper space: "governance not only serves as a signifier of a space
that exists outside of the state-government master construct, but also in
intimate connection with it."336
Fluidity and porosity in fractured space do not operate
seriatim-they function simultaneously throughout governance space;
that space is polycentric space. "If law is no longer the only authentic
and legitimate means of effectuating governance systems, and if states
are no longer necessarily the principal and superior organization for the
management of behavior, it may also follow that governance can exist in
multiple locations simultaneously."33 7 Polycentricity sets societal
constitutionalism in motion-constant motion. To some extent, it
suggests the focus on collaborative governance among multiple
governance stakeholders that is the hallmark of the "New Governance"
advocates.338 But it also suggests collision as much as collaboration and
335. See Backer, supra note 44.
336. See Backer, supra note 36, at 106 (citing James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and
Change in World Politics, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 122, at 1). See
generally COMPLEx SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING PoLITIcAL AUTHORITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Edgar Grande & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2005); PROSPECTS OF LEGAL
SEMIOTIcs (Anne Wagner & Jan M. Broekman eds., 2010).
337. Backer, supra note 44, at 196.
338. E.g., Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and
Self-Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' World, in 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 103, 108
(M. D. A. Freeman ed., 2002) ("Regulation therefore cannot take the behaviour of those
being regulated as a constant. Regulation is . . . the 'conduct of conduct', or. . . 'to act upon
action."') (citations omitted); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
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irritation as much as harmonization. 339 Apple, Inc. provides a case in
point-it is operating within and against multiple governance systems
with shifting authority and contributing to the polycentric irritation for
its own downstream supplier Foxconn, which also faces similar
irritations to its own societally constituted system, but one in a
relationship that that of Apple which is vertically arranged.
Together, this suggests a dynamic element to societal
constitutionalism that may help to explain-by the focus on constituted
societies within complexes of such entities-both the nature of
constitutive autonomy and the character of communication that, while
internalized, does not necessarily suggest a threat to or insufficiency of
separation from other governance bodies. This indicates intermeshing
beyond networking, irritation, and permeability. 340 It suggests instead
the simultaneous operation of multiple interpenetrations of systems
that remain stable only within a fluid context of constant
communication framed by the desires of overlapping stakeholders that
find expression through action (voting, consuming, investing, assessing,
reporting, etc.). This produces a regulatory polycentricity that is itself
dynamic among interacting and dynamically constituted societal
organizations, all of which then intermesh with public bodies, including
the state. These are the lessons that were illustrated by Apple, Inc. in
Section II, as it sought to protect its self constitution in the face of crisis
in a shared governance space. These lessons, in turn, may well provide a
basis in theory for understanding phenomena, like that of the
governance structures of Apple, Inc., that gets us closer to conforming
our theory-ideology to the realities around us. The dynamic element of
societal constitutionalism, especially for nonstate governance
organizations, solves the difficulty of a static view of societal
constitutionalism-the logic of autonomy within self-constituting
societies that do not have either territory or broad function that operate
in a space in which states continue to assert a broad authority, but in
which other actors also intervene beyond and among states.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 550-56 (2000) (negotiated rulemaking); Elinor Ostrom, Beyond
Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. EcON.
REV. 641, 641 (2010) ("Scholars are slowly shifting from positing simple systems to using
more complex frameworks, theories, and models to understand the diversity of puzzles
and problems facing humans interacting in contemporary societies.").
339. See Larry CatA Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations'
"Protect-Respect-Remedy" Project: The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a
Global Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 37, 73-77 (2010) (discussing "[tihe
corporate responsibility to respect human rights").
340. Cf. Teubner, supra note 118, at 212-13 (discussing the factors necessary for the
success of corporate codes).
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CONCLUSION
"In 1973 Niklas Luhmann could still assert that a radical change in
the state of the constitution and the institutional and operational
understanding of constitutional arrangements comparable to the
establishment of the constitutional state in the 18th century has never
occurred again."341 This radical change has since occurred.
Constitutionalism has become something more than a means to deepen
the logic of the state system upon which much of constitutional
development was based. Having served as a template for the
"perfectable" state, it has become the framework for judging the
legitimacy and value of all constituting societies. The various
settlements of the aftermath of the second World War were meant to
institute an international system that would protect the state system,
now tamed by an appropriate foundation of substantive values. But the
system that it created-public and international on the one hand, and
private and globalized, on the other-gave rise to fracture of governance
even as it provided a basis for the protection of the state system. In
effect, globalization and the internationalization of law extended the
space for governance. States continue to exist as they did, but
governance now has become institutionalized beyond the frontiers of the
traditional jurisdictions of states. "The history of modernity has been
that of increasing complexity in the patterns of social and economic
organization, defiant of singular or all-embracing solutions. . . . Yet, in
much of our thinking,. we continue to believe that society can somehow
be governed or steered."342
This article considered the consequences of this emerging
framework of hierarchical power arrangements and horizontal effects
for constitutional theory among this amalgam of states and other
societally constituted organisms in three-dimensional space. Section I
engaged in framework setting, focusing on the structures of societal
constitutionalism within the logic of globalization. This consideration
necessarily frames societies and their constitution from a spatially
static and inward-looking perspective. That investigation first
considered societal constitutionalism as a set of parameters for the
ordering system of states and nonstate actors and then the organization
of corporate actors within this framework in the context of the human
rights impacts of corporations. Section II considered these constituted
societies in a more dynamic and outward-looking perspective. The
341. Grimm, supra note 30, at 71.
342. Ash Amin & Jerzy Hausner, Interactive Governance and Social Complexity, in
BEYOND MARKET AND HIERARCHY: INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL COMPLEXITY 1,
1 (Ash Amin & Jerzy Hausner eds., 1997).
877
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
episode of Apple, Foxconn and the worker suicides suggest not merely
two dimensional space-the structural coupling and intermeshing
among self-referential societally-constituted entities and states, but
rather a three-dimensional space in which hierarchies might exist in all
directions among clusters of states, nonstate self-constituted actors and
other organisms that produce and monitor governance. If societies can
be understood as subject to certain principles for their inward
constitution, to what extent might there be principles that affect the
outward expression of inward self-constitution, especially when that
direction is not merely "up" and "down" a two dimensional hierarchy?
That consideration requires both an examination of the way in which
societally constituted entities may be felt and seen by outsiders, but also
the way that expressive communication can have inward affecting
consequences. For that purpose, Gunther Teubner's notions of addiction
and chaos and Hans Lindahl's notions of spatiality and communication
serve as a starting point.
Section III had as it subjects the consideration of the theoretical
consequences of the realities explored earlier. What in Section I
appeared as little more than the expansion of the family of
self-constituted actors becomes, in Section II, a polycentric mass that
not just communicates but collides, conflicts, and affects the external
extent of governance spaces and the internal organization of those
spaces. The context is the enforcement of international human rights
norms through the governance activities of Apple Inc. and its supply
chain. The focus is the spaces where systems converge, harmonize, and
collide. But Section III suggested theoretical order to the chaos, and a
structure that extends and generalizes the particular factual context of
Apple's crisis and its resolution.
Section III suggested the need to expand our understanding of
constitutional theory beyond incarnation and judgment, to include
communication among systems in a complex polycentric constituting
universe in which territory remains an essential feature of systemic
differentiation, but the character of territory becomes substantially
more mutable. The conclusion is one that fundamentally shifts the focus
of Ralf Michael's brilliant analysis of lex mercatoria ("the lex mercatoria
without a state remains within a state-focused legal paradigm")343-the
societal constitution beyond the state remains engaged by and with the
state and is not absorbed within a state-focused legal paradigm. The
article thus concludes where it started-in constitutional theory. Now
liberated from the state, and its theoretical constraints, and of the
public-private binary that also privileges the state (and law) as the
343. Michaels, supra note 116, at 452.
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center of constitutional analysis, societal constitutionalism is put in
motion that oscillates rather than moving back and forth between public
and private spheres.
In his 1920 Hibbert lectures on "The State, Visible and Invisible,"344
the English author, Anglican prelate, and professor of Divinity at
Cambridge, William Ralph Inge, criticized the deification of the state
qua state. But in a moment of prescient clarity logic took him further:
We are perhaps on the threshold of an epoch in which
other associations, either wider than the nation, like the
Catholic Church, or Labor, or narrower than the nation,
like the groups which it is proposed to form into trade
guilds, may claim and receive the same immoral and
unquestioning devotion which, when given to the State,
has brought such hideous calamities upon the world. If
so, we shall find that the error is not less destructive in
its new forms.345
We have arrived at such an age. Whether, indeed, the multi-spatial
and polycentric governance frameworks of a world structured on
principles of societal constitutionalism will live down to Dean Inge's
vision remains to be seen, but what is clear is that the transformation
from the monotheism of state worship to the more complex paganism of
the modern age of government without the state will surely reshape the
relationships between individuals and governance organs.
344. William Ralph Inge, The God-State, in LEVIATHAN IN CRISIS: AN INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON THE STATE, ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, BY FIFTY-FOUR TWENTIETH
CENTURY WRITERS 150, 150 (Waldo R. Browne ed., 1946).
345. Id. at 153.
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